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Although the origin of export control can be traced
back to the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917,1 the
current system of U.s. export controls began with the Export
Control Act of 1949. After the Second World War, Congress
passed this legislation to establish a strategic embargo
against communist nations in an attempt to control trade to
further the national security and foreign policy interests
of the West. Besides, Congress also passed other laws to
prohibit the export of weapons and other military hardware
and technology that could affect world peace or the security
and foreign policy of the united States, which is beyond the
focus of this thesis.
During the 1960s, due to the erosion of the consensus
toward export controls among the allies and the pressure
from the business world, Congress reformed the export
control laws by passing the Export Administration Act of
1969. The U.S. export control system before 1969 possessed
no inherent limits: conceivably any good or technology could
be strategically significant. For example, even buttons were
strategic because they could be used to hold up Soviet
soldiers' pants. Due to (1) America's declining influence in
1 Original version at Ch.106, 40 Stat. 411, 1919
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the international trading system, (2) dissatisfaction by
some allies with the broad scope and inflexibility of u.s.
and CoCom systems, and (3) the complaints by u.s. exporters
about such an expansive policy of export control combined to
pressure for reform, Congress responded to the change by
limiting export controls to products and technology that
contribute significantly to the military capability of the
controlled country. For the first time, preserving the
Western superiority in defense-related technologies, rather
than economic warfare per se, became the statutory goal of
u.s. export and COCOM policies.
In the next ten years, however, despite the changed
congressional focus, the strategy of economic containment
was not jettisoned and the policy of containment remained
firmly embedded in the institutional practices of the u.s.
government and COCOM. The increasing tension between the
u.s. business interests and the national security and
foreign policy interests made Congress ultimately pass the
Export Administration Act of 1979, which considerably
modified the u.s. domestic export control program. Among
other things, the Act required the government, in its
exercise of export controls over duel-use goods and
technology, to balance trade and business opportunities for
exporters against national security interests.2 Several
2 . 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2)
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additional changes were made in the EAA when Congress
enacted the Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985 and
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. Among
other things, these amendments to EAA made efforts to ease
licensing requirements, facilitate export review, clarify
enforcement jurisdiction among competing government
agencies, stiffen penalties for export control violations
and eliminate many reexport controls on US-origin goods. To
implement the EAA and its subsequent extensive amendments,
the Department of Commerce promulgated the Export
Administration RegulationS{EAR).3
At those times that the EAA has lapsed, the EAR have
been maintained under the International Emergency Economic
Act.4 Most recently this occurred by Presidential Executive
Order No. 12730 of September 30, 1990. There is no
substantial changes in the system up to now even after the
Clinton Administration took over the power.
This thesis is designed, on one hand, to provide an
overview of the laws and regulations with respect to (l)the
underlining ideas that created the laws and regulations;
(2)the government agencies that perform export control
functions, with a focus on "duel-use" goods and technology
control by the Department of Commerce; and (3) how export
controls are implemented both at the US domestic and
3 . 15 C.F.R. §§ 768-799.
4 . 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701, et sea.
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international levels. In addition, the thesis evaluates the
very complicated export licensing system, by looking at
l)three kinds of licenses, 2)reexport control and
3)technology and software control, with regard to the
operational function of the US export control laws and
regulations. Finally, it discusses how the laws and
regulations are applied to exports to the PRC, which might
be of a help to the development of Sino-US trade, with the
objective of exploring their impact on the Sino-US trade.
PART II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. EXPORT CONTROL MECHANISM
A. Control Jurisdiction
Numerous government agencies are involved in the U.S.
export control system. Some are involved in the daily
licensing process, some perform the control function by
reviewing the export applications, and others specialize in
developing new export control policies and so on. The key
agencies are:
1. Department of Commerce
The Department of Commerce{DOC) has extensive power to
regulate duel-use item exports for commercial purposes.
Commerce maintains the Export Administration
Regulations (EAR) 5 under the authority of Export
Administration Act{EAA) of 1979, as amended in 1985 and
1988. Through the regulations, Commerce can prevent anything
from getting out of the United States for national security,
foreign policy or even economic reasons.
The Bureau of Export Administration{BXA), headed by the
Under Secretary for Export Administration, is a very
powerful government unit that has the broadest impact on
U.S. export and reexport business. The agency, in general,
controls duel-use items that have civil uses but can readily
5 .15 C.F.R. §§ 768-799
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be utilized in military applications, or are deemed to have
strategic significance. The Under Secretary of Commerce is
assisted by two Assistant Secretaries, one for Export
Administration, the other for Export Enforcement. The three
are Presidential appointees confirmed by the Senate. BXA
operates field offices in Newport Beach and Santa Clara,
California; Portland, Oregon; and Nashua, New Hampshire. BXA
people serve as embassy export control attaches in
switzerland, Austria and India.
The Office of Export Licensing(OEL) is the processing
arm of BXA. OEL receives applications for export license and
reexport authorization, determines whether an application is
sufficient (insufficient application, or applications which
need not have been filed are "Returned without Action"),
routes it to Licensing Officers within OEL for action,
sends the application to other agencies for review when
appropriate, transmits certain applications to COCOM in
Paris for Action when necessary, and then issues the license
or denies the application.6
The Office of Technology and Policy Analysis(OTPA) is
BXA's arm to develop policies regarding the treatment of
various items by OEL. For example, it is OTPA's job among
other things, to stay abreast of advancing technologies so
that policy can be developed on the licensing of new items
6. See Procedure for processing licensing application. 15
C.F.R. § 770.13
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and decontrol of items that have become obsolescent. OTPA
works with other u.s. agencies to formulate u.s. national
policies on these issues and it represents the Commerce
Department at COCOM meetings in Paris where multinational
policy is developed. OTPA prepares additions and changes to
the EAR with support from the Office of Chief Counsel for
Export Administration.
The Office of Foreign Availability(OFA) was created by
the EAA Amendment of 1985, which requires the Office to
analyze whether any controlled item should be removed from
u.s. export control list because it is readily available
from a foreign country. The criteria for the determination
of foreign availability is that any such goods or technology
are available in fact to controlled countries from such
sources in sufficient quantities and of comparable quality
so that the requirement of a validated license for export of
such goods or technology is or would be ineffective.7
Negotiations to eliminate such availability by obtaining
control cooperation from foreign governments can delay or
obviate the decontrol in this respect.8 However, the burden
of proof for curtailing the implication of foreign
availability is now on government. While exporters still
have to provide as much detailed information as possible,
the Commerce Department is directed to "accept the
7 . 50 U.S.C.A. App. §2404 (f)(1) (A).
8. rd. §2404(f)(4).
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representations of applicants unless such representations
are contradicted by reliable evidence ...,,9
The Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) is the
institutional unit that carries out Commerce's
responsibilities regarding the enforcement the EAA and EAR.
OEE maintains e_ght field offices throughout the u.s. Its
Special Agents are authorized to carry firearms, make
arrests and issue subpoenas. OEE or the Office of the Chief
Counsel for Export Administration will refer cases involving
possible criminal penalties to the Department of Justice. On
the other hand, under the EAA, OEE may impose civil money
penalties and/or deny export/reexport privilege to companies
and individuals who are deemed to be in violation of the
EAA/EAR. OEE, through the Office or Chief Counsel for
Export Administration, will pursue administrative charges,
either to a negotiated settlement or before an
Administrative Law Judge, who makes a recommendation to the
d t h h th It' t f d .. 10Un er Secre ary, w 0 as e u 1ma e power 0 eC1S10n.
2. Department of State
The Department of State is responsible for controlling
defense service and defense articles under the authority of
9 . D. Colette Gonzalez, How to Increase Technology Exports
wi thout Risking National Securi ty--An In-Depth Look at the
Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, 8 Loyola of Los
Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal 428 (1985-
1986)
10. 15 C.F.R. §.787
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Arms Export Control Act(AECA) and International Traffic in
Arms Regulations(ITAR) thereunder.11 These laws are
completely separate from the EAA/EAR export control system.
The Office of Defense Trade Control (DTC), within the
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs headed by an Assistant
Secretary ma1nta1ns the U S Mun1't1'onsL1'st,12 wh1'ch 1'S, ....
the u.S. version of COCOM ML. In principle, the ML differs
from the CCL in that it applies to commodities/technical
data which are" ...deemed to be inherently military in
13character." Military end use is not the determining
factor, although" •.•predominantly military application is
taken into account" in the determination whether
commodities/technology should be included on the ML.14
Actually, however, there are a range of electronic items
included on the ML which have significant duel uses(e.g.
"privacy devices" in Category XIII(b». The ML lacks detail
in comparison with the CCL. Consequently, many particular
commodities, as a practical matter,have been added to the ML
through the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
clauses which are included in 000 contracts and which
required that the subject matter of the contracts be treated
as coming within the ITAR. As a result, many exporters are
11· 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130.




uncertain whether a commodity is covered by the ML or the
CCL. Pursuant to ITAR S120.5, an exporter may submit
detailed information on a commodity to DTC and request a
determination whether the commodity is covered by the CCL or
the ML. A special jurisdiction team has been created by DTC
15to handle such requests.
Under the ITAR, in order to export any military items,
the exporter must register with DTC to have a privilege to
do so. If a license is controlled on the ML, a license will
be required for export and reexport to all destinations,
including COCOM countries and other close allies, although
Canada is exempted from a wide range of licensing
requirements. 16 In close coordination with the Defense
Technology Security Administration (DTSA), which reviews
applications and recommends approval or denial, DTC not only
considers the application on basis of national security, but
also foreign policy and economic interests in granting or
denying a license.
The Department of State also has power to review export
and reexport applications for duel-use items. Normally, any
export or reexport control for foreign policy reasons will
15. Evan R. Berlack and Cecil
Control, Coping with U.S.
Practicing Law Institute.
16 . 22 C.F.R. S 126.5.
Hunt, Overview of u.s. Export
Export Controls(1992) P.20,
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be reviewed by the Office of East-West Trade. This Office
will obtain the views of the cognizant regional bureau.
3. Department of Defense.
The Department of Defense(DOD) plays an extremely
important role in the export control, though it does not
function as a licensing agency like the Department of
Commerce and state. Many applications to Department of
Commerce for an Export license or Reexport Authorization
will require review by one or more agencies, including
Department of Defense, state and Department of Energy,
regarding the commodity and technology, the destinations and
end-use.
Briefly, most exports and reexports to any country
within Country group Q, W, Y, and the People's Republic of
China, as well as exports and reexports of "sensitive"
controlled commodities to certain free-world countries like
India are reviewed by the Defense Technology Security
Administration(DTSA), and recommended by DTSA for license
approval or denial. Nuclear-related exports and reexports
are reviewed by other office called the Office of
International Security Affairs (ISA), which is a part of the
Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Non-Proliferation
Policy. Under the EAA, the Department of Defense is required
to developed a Military critical Technologies List (MCTL),
with an emphasis on (1) design and manufacturing know-
how, (2)goods not available outside the united States that,
12
if exported, would permit significant military advances in
controlled countries, (3) equipment that would give an enemy
or potential hostile foreign country insight into the design
and manufacturer of u.s. military systems.17 There have
been many controversies as to whether Department of Defense
should have a role in export controls to COCOM18 member
countries,19 though it is clear that it has a national
security responsibility in export controls to any
20country. The problem is that 000 is security-oriented
regarding export trade while Department of Commerce is
business-oriented. This often causes many conflicts between
the two as to whether a license should be granted or denied.
This hurts u.s. businesses by prolonging applications and
17 · 50 U.S.C. app. §2404(d).
18 · See Page 40 of this thesis.
19· Ihor Fedorowycz, Preventing the Transfer of Militarily
critical Technology to the soviet Block: The Case for,strong
National Security Export Control, 26 Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law, 53-102.
20 "(l)Notwithstanding any other provision of this section,
the Secretary of Defense is authorized to review any proposed
export of any goods or technology to any country to which
exports are controlled for national security purposes and,
whether the Secretary of Defense determines that the export of
such goods or technology will make a significant contribution,
which would prove detrimental to the national security of the
united States, to the military potential of any such country,
to recommend to the President that such export be disapproved.
(2)Whenever a license or other authority is requested for an
export to any country to which exports are controlled for
national security purposes ..., the secretary of Commerce shall




discouraging the transactions.21 Up to now, DOD is still
reviewing certain export applications for COCOM countries on
the basis of national security.22 The Inter-Agency
Operating Committee("OC") has been established in an attempt
to resolve disputes between BXA and DTSA or other agencies
over pending applications for export license. the OC is
chaired by a Commerce Department official and includes
representatives from OTPA, DTSA and from the state
Department. Disputes that can't be resolved within the OC
are escalated to sub-cabinet inter-agency consideration
involving the same agencies and ultimately may go to the
White House for a Presidential decision.
4. Treasury Department.
The Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets
Control (FAC) administers embargoes and economic sanctions
against foreign countries to further U.s. foreign policy and
national security goals. The FAC relies principally on the
21. Matthew W. Sawchak, The Department of Defense's Role in
Free-World Export Licensing Under the Export Administration
Act, 1988 Duke L.J. 785.
There is a subsection titled "processing Licensing
Applications for COCOM participating countries and other
selected countries" (Austria, Finland, Hong kong, Ireland,
Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland) .under
EAR, which provides that when review by another agency is
necessary, OEL will allow that agency reasonable time for
concurrent review of the application within 15 to 30 days
allowed by the Act. 15 C.F.R. S770.14(d). Obviously,
Department of Commerce is prepared to submit to DoD the
applications for exports of certain sensitive goods and
technology for national security review.
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President's broad power under section 5 (b) of the Trading
with Enemy Act,23 or more recently, the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act.24
The Office of Foreign Assets Control has four
operational divisions. The Blocked Assets Division
administers blocked foreign funds and property and conducts
censuses of blocked assets. The Enforcement Division
investigates sanction violations, administers the specially
designated nationals programs, and coordinates intelligence
matters. The licensing Division makes determinations on
requests for licenses, monitors compliance with licensing
provisions and financial transactions, and imposes civil
penalties for violations.
Currently, the FAC administers asset freezes and
economic embargoes against Cuba, Haiti, Iraq, Libya, North
Korea and vietnam as well as trade and economic sanctions
't 25 h 1 t' 1 t t daga~ns Iran. T e FAC regu a ~ons over ap 0 some ex en
with the foreign policy controls by the EAA and EAR.
23 • 50 U.S.C. App. 1 et seq.
24 • 50 U.S.C. S 1701 et seq.
25 • See Cuban Assets control Regulations 31 C.F.R. §515;
Foreign Assets Control Regulations 31 C.F.R. §500; Haiti ,
Executive Order No. 12775 and 12779, 56 F.R.195(October 7,
1991); Iraqi Sanctions Regulations 31 C.F.R. 575; Libya
Sanctions Regulation 31 C.F.R. 550; Transactions Regulations
31 C.F.R. 505; Special Designated Nationals as of October 4,
1991 by office of Foreign Assets Control. All these
regulations are based on the Trading with Enemy Act of 1917 as





a. Nuclear Regulatory commission(NRC)
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is one of three
agencies(including the Department of Energy and Commerce)
that have export control responsibility over commodities and
technology in connection with nuclear materials. The NRC
regulates, under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of
261954,as amended, exports of nuclear reactor vessels and
commodities specially designed or prepared for nuclear
reactors, which includes all things inside and attached to
reactor vessels.27
b. Department of Energy.
Under the Authority of the Atomic Energy Act, the
Department of Energy controls exports of technical data
directly and indirectly related to the production of nuclear
t . I 28 th h th . t t F . At .ma er1a s, roug e ASS1S ance 0 ore1gn om1C
26 . 42 U.S.C. S 2011 et que.
10 C.F.R. Sl10. The Export and Import of Nuclear
Facilities and Materials Regulations prescribe licensing,
enforcement, and rulemaking procedures and criteria, under the
Atomic Energy Act, for the export of nuclear equipment and
material, as set out in s 110.8, and the import of nuclear
equipment and material, as set out in s 110.9.
28. Under the Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities
Regulations, Following activities require specific
authorization by the Secretary of Energy: (a) Engaging
directly or indirectly in the production of special nuclear
material in any of the countries listed below: Afghanistan,
Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Burma, Chile, China, People's Republic of Comoros,
Cuba, Czechoslovakia, OJibouti, Estonia, Guyana, Hungary,
India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kampuchea, North Korea, Kuwait,
Laos, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Mauritania, Monaco, Mongolian
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Energy Activities Regulations.29 The Department of Energy
also regulates exports of natural gas and electric power and
construction, operation, maintenance, or connection of
30facilities for such export from the United states.
c. Patent and Trademark Office.
31The Intervention Secrecy Act and its implementing
regulations32 provide that the Commissioner of Patent and
People's Democratic Republic, Mozambique, Niger, Oman,
Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, South Africa,
Soviet Union, Syria, Tanzania, united Arab Emirates, Vanuatu,
Vietnam, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Zambia,
Zimbabwe. Countries may be removed from or added to this list
by amendments published in the Federal Register;
(b) Providing sensitive nuclear technology for an activity in
any foreign country; (c) Engaging in or providing assistance
in any of the following activities with respect to any foreign
country:
(1) Designing production reactors or facilities for the
separation of isotopes of source or special nuclear
material (enrichment), chemical processing of irradiated
special nuclear material (reprocessing), fabrication of
nuclear fuel containing plutonium, or the production of
heavy water;
(2) constructing, fabricating, operating, or maintaining
such reactors or facilities;
(3) Designing, constructing, fabricating, operating or
maintaining components specially designed, modified or
adapted for use in such reactors or facilities;
(4) Designing, constructing, fabricating, operating or
maintaining major critical components for use in such
reactors or production-scale facilities; or
(5) Training in the above-mentioned activities from (1)
to (4). See "Activities Requiring Authorization" 10
C.F.R. S810.8.
29 Id. §810.·
30 10 C.F.R. §§ 305, 320; 18 C.F.R. §34.3.·
31 35 U.S.C. §S181-188 (1982) •·
32 37 C.F.R. §5 (1988) •·
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Trademark shall, on the advice of the head of a department
with national security responsibilities, seal and keep
secret any patent application whose disclosure might
adversely affect consequences for national security.33 On
the other hand, A foreign patent application with respect to
any invention made in the united states may not be filed
without a license unless a domestic patent application has
been filed and six months have passed without notice of a
secret order.34 The Patent and Trademark Office has
jurisdiction to authorize, by a license, the foreign filling
of a patent application to export technology invented in the
united states. Thus, the Patent and Trademark Office is the
licensing agency for the foreign filling of an invention
made in the united states.
d. Drug Enforcement Administration.
The Drug Enforcement Administration of the Department
of Justice exercises jurisdiction over exports of narcotics
and dangerous drugs, and is assuming jurisdiction over
exports of certain chemicals used in drug processing.
e.U.S.Maritime Administration.35
The Maritime Administration regulates exports of
certain vessels. Commercial Vessels or their navigational
33 · 35 U.S.C. S181.
34 · Id.; 37 C.F.R. S 5.11.
35 • 21 C.F.R. SS 1311-1313.
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equipment may also required BXA authorization. 36 In
contrast, military vessels are regulated by the Office of
Defense Trade Controls.
f. Miscellaneous Responsibilities.
The Department of Agriculture regulates the export of
any tobacco seed and certain live tobacco plants.37 The
Department of the Interior and the National Marine Fishes
Service regulates exports of endangered fish an
'ldl'f 38Wl 1 e.
B.Statutorv Authority for EXDort Control
1. General.
since Congress promulgated the first peacetime export
control act in 1949, there have been many changes in the
legislative statutes regarding export controls.39 For many
years, Congress tried to achieve some balance between the
national security protection and trade promotion objectives
when reenacting or amending EAA. No matter what changes took
place, however, three prominent features of the u.s. export
control scheme have persisted. They are:
(l)Exemption of the rulemaking and enforcement process
from the judicial review requirements of the Administrative
36 · 15 C.F.R. §770.10(f)
37 · 7 C.F.R. §34.3.
38 · 50 C.F.R. §17.222.
39. Here I am mainly talking about the duel-use export control
regulated by EAA and EAR.
19
40Procedure Act. The lack of judicial review has helped to
prevent resolution of the Executive's and Congress's dispute
over section 10(g). Although the 1988 Amendment added some
41judicial review to the export enforcement process, all
free from the judicial review.
(3)Broad delegation to the President of authority to
substantive export licensing application processing is still
(a)-(b).(e), 50 U.S.C. app. S2412(a)-(b).(e)
exemption from Administrative Procedure Act, 5
553-559, 701-706, and imposing substitute appeal
EAA §20, 50 U.S.C. app. S2419 (prescribing four-year
validity period for the statute and showing frequency of
congressional reauthorization of export controls. In November
1990, the President effected a pocket veto of EAA renewal
legislation. Although the EAA expired on September 30, 1990,
the President, invoked the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, continued in effect the powers of the EAA and EAR
in the Executive Order 12730 of September 30, 1990.)
43.Berman & Garson, united states Export Control--Past,
Present, and Future, 67 Colum.L.Rev. 791,792(1976); Matthew
40





41. According to "Procedures relating to civil penalties and
sanctions" of the 1988 amendment to EAA, "the order of the
Secretary ...shall be final except that the charged party may,
within 15 days after the order is issued, appeal the order in
the united States Court of Appeal for District of Columbia
circuit, which shall have jurisdiction of the appeal .... The
court may review only those issues necessary to determine
liability for the civil penalty or other sanction involved."
50 U.S.C. S2412 (C) (3).
42
shape, administer and enforce the export licensing
regime.43 The President, in turn, has delegated nearly all
Congress frequent opportunities to rethink its earlier
1· . d t 42po 1CY JU gmen s.
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a. National Security.
important factors control DOC's exercise of its power.
The Secretary of Commerce ist' 1 't 46na 10na secur1 y.
47· "General Policy" 15 C.F.R. S 770.1(a) (3).
over exports from the standpoint of their significance to
the national security of the united states.47 Three most
export controls is to restrict the export of goods and
national security, foreign policy and short supply.
countries which would prove detrimental to the United States
of this authority to the Department of commerce,44 which
exercises its delegated authority through the Export
Administration Regulations(EAR).45
technology which may significantly contribute to the
military potential of any other country or combination of
The EAA provides discretionary authority for the
Congress, in the EAA, has authorized that the use of
2. Discretionary Controls.
specifically empowered to exercise the necessary vigilance
President to impose export control for three purposes:
W.Sawchak, The Department or Derense's Role in Free-World
Export Licensing Under the Export Administration Act, 1988
Duke L.J. 785, 791. (probably no single piece of legislation
gives more power to the President to control American
commerce)
44 • Exec. Order No.12214, 3 C.F.R. 256 (1981), 50 U.S.C.A.
app. §2403(1991).
45 • 15 C.F.R. 55368-399.
46 .50 U.S.C. app.S2402.
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First, all duel-use commodities or technologies subject to
DOC's discretionary control must be identified in the List
of Military critical Technology established mainly by the
Secretary of Defense in conjunction with the Secretary of
48Commerce. The List of Military critical Technologies
emphasizes:
(a)arrays of design and manufacturing know-how,
(b)keystone manufacturing, inspection, and test
equipment,
(c)goods accompanied by sophisticated operation,
application, or maintenance know-how, and
(d)keystone equipment which would reveal or give
insight into the design and manufacture of a united States
'l't t 49m1 1 ary sys em.
Second, all national security controls are usually
administered on the basis of multilateral controls, i.e.
commodity or technology that is controlled for national
security reasons is usually not available from outside the
united States to the controlled country. Third, the export
of such commodity or technology would permit a significant
advance in a military system of any such country.
b. Foreign Policy.
Foreign policy is the second biggest category for U.S.
export controls. The export of goods and technology are
48 . 50 U.S.C. app. 2404(d) (1).
49 • Id. (2) •
22
restricted where necessary to further significantly the
foreign policy of the united states or to fulfill its
declared international obligations50 Foreign policy
controls are applicable to many, but not all, of the same
goods and technology that are subject to national security
controls. However, such controls are not necessarily
directed only at "controlled countries", since they may be
implemented solely for the purpose of fulfilling u.s.
foreign policy objectives and international obligations. For
example, foreign policy controls relating to Nuclear Non-
Proliferation considerations, as well as Missile Technology
controls and Chemical/Biological Warfare controls are in
certain instances relevant to items which are not covered by
the CoCom list, but which the u.s. has deemed to be
important to control, either unilaterally or in cooperation
with other countries.
For foreign policy reasons, the u.s. maintains
unilateral controls on virtually all items(except publicly
available technical data) destined for country groups Sand
Z(Vietnam, North Korea, Cuba, Libya) and South African
military and police entities. These controls are implemented
throughout the Commodity Control List(CCL) in various Export
Control Classification Numbers (ECCN), including ECCN's
bearing the final letter "G" which covers at the Sand Z
50. 50 U.S.C. 2402(2) (B), 15 C.F.R. S 770.1(a) (2).
23
t' 1 th th f ' I' d 'l't 51coun r1es p us e Sou A r1can po 1ce an m1 1 ary.
Foreign policy controls are also directed at the countries
where the u.S. is concerned that particular items will be
used for purpose of terrorism.52
c.Short Supply.
Congress has authorized the President "to restrict the
export of goods where necessary to protect the domestic
economy from the excessive drain of scare materials and to
reduce the serious inflationary impact of foreign
53demand." When such controls are imposed, the goal is to
restrict exports of scare supplies and reduce inflationary
pressures caused by foreign demand, while minimizing, if
possible, the disruption of normal patterns of export trade.
The most recent quantitative restrictions applied to
petroleum products from 1973 to 1981. Commerce established,
though Export Administration Regulation, quotas for
individual exporters based on a percentage of the exporter's
historical trade with a country during a representative base
period. The current regulations also contain procedures that
could be utilized to establish and allocate quotas if
54necessary.
51 15 C.F.R. §§785, 799.1.·
52 50 U.S.C. §2405(j) •· app.
53 50 U.S.C. §2402 (2) (c).· app.





57 · 15 C.F.R. §777.6.
58.Id. §777.6.
59 · Pub. L. No. 101-382, 104 Stat. 487,
U.S.C. §§ 620-620j(1990).
55 · The procedure for such monitoring are set out in the EAR
Id. §777.15.
56 · 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406(c), 15 C.F.R. §777.8.
controls under the EAA for exports which, if used for
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act(NNPA) requires
certain exports controls are mandated by the EAA and
3. Mandatory Controls.
The EAA authorizes the Department of Commerce to
licensing of permitted exports.
Exports of unprocessed timber from certain western states
affected states(Oregon and Washington) administer the
are also restricted by Commerce under the Forest Resources
Conservation and Shortage Relief Act of 1990.59 The
effect pursuant to statute cover:
57(l)Petroleum and petroleum products
58(2)Western red cedar
provides a formalized procedure for petitions for monitoring
or controls on metallic materials capable of being
56recycled. Short supply licensing programs currently in
monitor exports and contracts for exports to decide whether
short-supply controls should be imposed.55 The EAA also
25
purposes other than those for which they are intended, would
be of significance for nuclear explosive purposes.60
Nuclear item controls are hybrid ones, based on both
national security and foreign policy grounds of the EAA and
subject to procedures mandated by the NNPA. The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission regulates exports of nuclear reactor
vessels and commodities specially designed or prepared for
nuclear reactors, which means everything inside and attached
61to the reactor vessels. The Department of Energy
controls exports of technical data directly or indirectly
related to the production of special nuclear materials.62
The Department of Commerce controls all other goods and
technology related to nuclear power plants, duel use nuclear
related commodities, and otherwise uncontrolled commodities,
if they are for use in sensitive nuclear activity.63
b. Crime Control Instruments.
Crime control and detection instruments must be subject
to licensing to all destinations, except NATO countries,
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.64 These controls are
within the foreign policy controls under the Presidential
discretion.
60 42 U.S.C.A. S2139 (a) (b)•·
61 10 C.F.R. Sl10.·
62 10 C.F.R. S810.·
63 15 C.F.R. S 778.·
64 50 U.S.C.A. 2405(k).· app.
65
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c. Countries Supporting International Terrorism.
A validated license shall be required. In addition,
Congress must be notified 30 days before any export is
approved, if it is going to a country that is determined by
the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support
for acts of international terrorism and the commodity is one
that the Secretary of State has determined could make a
significant contribution to the military potential of that
country to support acts of international terrorism.65 The
countries currently designated are Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya,
North Korea, and Syria.
d. Crude oil Regulation.
Restrictions on the export of crude oil are based on
various statutes, including the EAA. The applicability of a
particular statute may depend on the source of the oil.
(a)Alaskan North Slope oil may not be exported without
certain Presidential findings and a joint resolution of
Congress approving the export.66 Excluded from the
restriction are l)barrel for barrel exchanges with an
"adjacent foreign country" that will result in lower prices
for consumers of petroleum products, and 2)temporary
exports for convenience or increased efficiency of
50 U.S.C.A. app. S2405(j), as amended by §4 of the
Antiterrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989, Pu. L.
No. 101-222, 103 Stat. 1897 (1989).
66. EAA § 7(d); 1985 Amendments Act S 110.
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transportation across parts of an "adjacent foreign
country."
(b)Oil transported by pipeline over federal right of
ways granted pursuant to § 28(u) of the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1920, as amended 67 is restricted from exports, except
for exchanges with adjacent foreign states and temporary
exports returned to the U.S., unless the President makes a
finding that: 1) the export will not diminish the total
quantity or quality of petroleum available to the U.S., 2)is
in the national interest and 3)is in accord with the Export
Administration Act. Congress may disapprove the President's
national interest findings within 60 days by concurrent
resolution, but petroleum exports may be authorized until
Congress acts.
(c)The Energy Policy and Conservation Act68
prohibits the export of all domestic crude oil, unless the
President determines that such exports are in the national
interest and consistent with the purposes of the statute.
However, exchanges, temporary exports and historical trade
with Canada and Mexico are to be maintained. The President's
authority has been delegated to the Secretary of Commerce.
(d)Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act69
authorizes the president, by rule, to require that persons
67 .30 U.S.C S185(u).
68. 42 U.S.C §6212.
69. 10 U.S.C §7430(e).
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engaged in producing or transporting petroleum products take
actions he determines are necessary for the implementation
of the obligations of the united states under the
international energy program in so far as those obligations
relate to the international allocation of petroleum
products.
(e)Outer continental Shelf Lands Act 70 authorizes
the Secretary of Energy, in administering the Naval
petroleum reserves, to use, store, or sell oil produced from
them. This authorization, however, is subject to the EAA and
the oil can't be exported until the President makes and
publishes an express finding that the exports will not
diminish the total quantity of petroleum available to the
united States, and that such exports are in accordance with
the EAA of 1979.71
e. Refined Petroleum products.
Exports of refined petroleum products are not currently
restricted for reasons of short supply, but the EAA §7(e)
requires notice to Congress prior to licensing should such
restrictions be imposed. other statutes under which the
controls are maintained are the Energy policy and
Conservation Act and the Naval Petroleum Reserves Production
Act.
f. Unprocessed Western Red Cedar
70 . 43 U.S.C §1354.
71. 10 U.S.C. S730(e).
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1. Country Groups
For export control purposes, foreign countries are
Country Group S- Libya
46 U.S.C. SS 466a and 466b; 1985 Amendments Act S125.
Pub. L. 99-440 (22 U.S.C. S5054).73
EAA S 7(i) restricts export of unprocessed logs
h. Exports to South Africa
Country Group Q- Romania
c.Buildina Blocks of Export controls on dual-use
petroleum product to South Africa.
harvested from state or federal lands.
72g. Export of Horses.
police or apartheid enforcing agencies in South Africa
74 . 15 C.F.R. S 785.6.
75 • Supplement No.1, 15 C.F.R. S 770.
72
is an exception to the broad EAR exemption for exports for
t' . d 74consump 10n or use 1n Cana a.
75The country groups are:
section 304 of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of
198673 prohibits exports of computers to the military,
any country group and is referred to by name wherever there
commodities and technology
symbols Q, s, T, V, W, Y, and Z. Canada is not included in
separated into seven country groups designated by the
regulation) and bars the export of crude oil and refined
(nearly equivalent restrictions had already been imposed by
30
Country Group T- North, Central, and South
America; Bermuda and the Caribbean; except
Canada and Cuba
Country Group V-All countries not included in any
other country group (except Canada which is
not in any group)
Country Group W- Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland
Country Group Y-Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Laos,
Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolian People's Republic,
the geographic area formerly known as the U.S.S.R.
Country Group Z- Cuba, North Korea, vietnam
Shipments to territories, dependencies, and possessions
of the united States, including foreign trade zones, are not
considered "exports" because these destinations are included
in the definition of "United states.,,76
It is worth noticing that not all destination-based
differences in EAR requirements are expressed by reference
to country groups. Country listings contained in the
Supplements to parts of the EAR are also relevant, as are
the provisions of EAR Part 785, Special Country Policies and
provisions.77 In addition, the availability of certain
general licenses is limited to destinations specified in the
particular section of 15 C.F.R. Part 771. In short, the
complex and reoriented control structure may have outgrown
76 • 15 C.F.R. SS 770.2, 770.4.
77. 15 C.F.R. S 785.
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the country group divisions and may need a simplified new
approach.
2. Commodity Control List and Export Control
Classification Number
The Bureau of Export Administration(BXA) maintains the
Commerce Control List (CCL), which includes all items
(commodities, software, and technical data) subject to BXA
export controls. The latest CCL appeared in the August 29,
1991 Federal Register and took effect September 1, 1991.78
The CCL is the U.S. version of the CoCom Industrial
List except that the CCL not only includes the Core List,
i.e. the CoCom listed duel-use items control, but also
controls under such multilateral "non-proliferation" regimes
as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the
Australia Group(Chemical and biological warfare chemicals
and equipment) and the London Suppliers Group (nuclear) , plus
various controls imposed unilaterally by the united States.
The new CCL, like the former CCL, contains ten general
categories:
1. Materials (e.g., composites, ceramics, certain
alloys).
2. Materials processing (e.g., specialized ball
bearings, nuclear reactor and power plant equipment not
.regulated by the NRC, numerical control items, machine
tools, semiconductor production items, rObotics).
78. Codified at 15 C.F.R. §799.
32
3. Electronics (e.g., integrated circuits, substrates,
CAD software for integrated circuit design, frequency
synthesizers, signal analyzers, spectrometers,
oscilloscopes).
4. Computers (including peripherals).
5. Telecommunications and cryptography (note that much
general purpose software is on the Munitions List,
administered by the state Department, if it contains
encryption features).
6. Sensors (e.g., acoustic systems useful in submarine
detection, night and other limited-vision sensors,
specialized cameras, lasers, radar systems).
7. Avionics and navigation (e.g., inertial guidance
systems and components, Global Positioning Satellite-related
items).
8. Marine Technology (e.g., submersible and certain
surface vessels, certain marine engines, sophisticated
underwater cameras, software for propeller design (noise
reduction».
9. Propulsion Systems and Transportation Equipment
(e.g., certain aircraft engines, military trainer aircraft
not on the Munitions List, wind tunnels).
10. Miscellaneous (e.g., crime control equipment,
non-Munitions List firearms).
Each of the ten categories is subdivided into five
subcategories: (A) equipment, assemblies and components, (B)
33
test, inspection and production equipment, (C) material, (D)
software and (E) technology.
In the CCL, every item has a Export Control
Classification Number(ECCN). Each ECCN in the New CCL has a
five-figure identifier consisting of a single-digit number
(the Core List category), a single letter(the subcategory),
a two-digit number (the type of control--i.e., COCOM,
missile technology, nuclear, chemical, "other") and a single
letter (used to indicate which of the documentation
requirements of part 775 must be met for license
applications in the particular ECCN). Thus, for example,
ECCN 4A03A, which includes most COCOM-controlled computers,
is in the computer category (category 4) and the equipment
subcategory (subcategory A), is controlled by COCOM (code
79number 03), and is controlled for export to all
destinations except Canada (last code letter A). The
explanation of the CCL structure is included in "the
Commerce Control List and How to Use It.,,80
According to the CCL, the requirements for each
category tell why and where the ECCN is controlled. The
79 The two-digit numbers for types of controls are:
01-19 COCOM controls
20-39 Missile technology controls
40-59 Nuclear non-proliferation controls
60-79 Chemical and biological weapons controls
80-99 Other controls
80. 15 C.F.R. S 799.1.
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CB-Chemical or Biological Warfare
FP-Foreign Policy
81SS-Short Supply.
The former CCL, for the most part, did not include
technical data. Instead technical data, which included
software not expressly listed on the former CCL, were
controlled under part 779 of the EAR. The new CCL separates
"technology" from software and includes both types of items
within the individual CCL categories(ECCNs).
The CCL and ECCN are the extremely important elements
of the u.S. export contr9l regime, the understanding of
which is vital to exporters in complying with the u.S.
export laws and regulations.
3. Terminologies of Control Regime.
a. Controlled Goods and technology.
The controlled items in EAA are goods and technology.
"Goods" means any article, natural or manmade substance,
material, supply, or manufactured product, including
inspection and test equipment and excluding technical
81. Id.
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82data. "Technology" means the information and know-
how (whether in tangible form, such as models, prototypes,
drawing, sketches, diagrams, blue prints or technical
service) that can be used to manufacture, utilize, or
reconstruct goods, including computer software and technical
83date, but not the goods themselves. Obviously,
"technology" means information necessary for the deve-
lopment, production, or use of a product. The information
takes the form of technical data or technical assistance.
"Technical data" may take forms such as blueprints, plans,
diagrams, models, formulas, tables, engineering designs and
specifications, manuals, and instructions written or
recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, and
read only memories. "Technical Assistance" may take forms
such as instruction, skills training, working knowledge, and
consulting services, and may involve transfer of technical
data.84 These definitions and the definition of software
have been adopted to conform the EAR to the terminology and
definitions in the General Technology Note in the
multilateral list. Previous EAR usage employed the term
"technical data" and defined it to include software.85
82. EAA §16(3).
83. EAA §16(4).
84 .supplements Nos. 2 and 3 to 15 C.F.R. §799.1 (Revised,
effective September 1, 1991, 56 Fed. Reg. 42,824 (August
29, 1991); 15 C.F.R. §779.2(a) (draft, note 50).
85 . 15 C.F.R. §779.1(a) (1991).
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"Software" means a collection of one or more programs or
microprogram fixed in any tangible medium of expression to
86serve as instruction to an electronic computer.
b. Controlled Transactions.
For national security controls, the EAA authorizes BXA
to"prohibit or curtail the export of any goods or technology
subject to the jurisdiction of the united States or exported
by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the united
States." For foreign policy controls, the authority extends
to "any goods, technology, or other information.,,87 Short
88supply controls apply only to "goods."
The "goods and technology subject to the jurisdiction
of the united States" language is the basis for controlling
u.s.-origin goods and technology, inclUding reexports. In
addition, controls over foreign made products of United
States technology and foreign made products containing
United States parts rely on this authority.
The authority to control exports by "any person subject
to the jurisdiction of the united States" is the basis for
regulating exports of wholly foreign origin goods or
technology by a United States person. This authority had
86. Supplement No.3 to 15 C.F.R. §779.1 (Revised, effective
september 1, 1991, 56 Fed. Reg. 42,824, August 29, 1991); 15
C.F.R. §779.2 (a) (draft, note 50).
87. EAA §6 (a) (1).
88. EAA §7 (a) (1).
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been virtually unused until the August 1991 issuance of new
proliferation related controls.
The term "export" includes a transfer to any person
within the united states with knowledge or intent that the
goods or technology will be shipped, transferred, or
transmitted to an unauthorized recipient and a transfer in
the United states to an embassy or "affiliate" (governmental
89or commercial) of a controlled country. An "export of
technology or software" includes not only shipping,
carrying, or transmitting it out of the united states, but
also its release in a foreign country. In addition, an
export includes any release in the united states with the
knowledge or intent that it will be shipped from the united
states to a foreign country. Such knowledge or intent is
presumed from release to a foreign national unless that
foreign national falls into one of the categories specified
in the EAR. Technology can be "released" through visual
inspection of data, equipment, and facilities; through oral
communication; through application of skills; and through
training people. Software is "released" through disclosure
f 't d 90o 1 S source co e.
c. Controlled Countries.
89. EAA SS 5(a) (1), 16(5); 1985 Amendments Act SS105(a), 117;
1988 Trade Act S2413.
90. 15 C.F.R. S779.2(c) (draft, note 50).
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"Controlled countries" are countries that have been
identified as targets of national security controls in
accordance with the EAA.91 These countries are the
People's Republic of China and the countries in Country
Groups Q, W, and Y. Reforms in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and
Hungary may result in their removal from the "controlled"
category. The Baltic states and the rest of the territory
that constituted the former Union of Soviet socialist
Republics have been for the time being, been left subject to
the same EAR provisions. Political developments and
development of the capacity and commitment of these states
to safeguard sensitive exports can lead to liberalized
export control policies or a change in Country Group.
Although validated licenses may also be required for
exports of goods or data controlled solely for national
security reasons to destinations outside of the controlled
countries, the purpose of the licensing requirement in such
cases is to assess the risk of diversion to controlled
countries.
"Embargoed destinations" are the countries in Group Z,
North Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba. virtually all exports and
reexports to these destinations are subject to licensing,
and the general policy is to deny such exports and
reexports.
d. Export License.
91. EAA §§5(B) (1) and 16(6).
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Under the EAR, the export of all commodities,
technology, and software is prohibited unless a general
license authorizes such export or a validated license or
other authorization is granted by BXA, except:92
a.Any export to Canada, for consumption in Canada, with
t· 93 d' t' tsome excep 10ns. Cana a lS no ln any coun ry group.
b.Export for the official use of the u.s. Armed Forces.
c.Exports under the exclusive export control
jurisdiction of another u.s. Government agency;94
d.Shipments that transit the united states without
unloading, provided they are not originally manifested for
the united states;95 and
e.Certain shipments of foreign-origin items from united
states foreign-trade zones.96
An "individual validated license" is a document issued
by BXA in response to an application filed by an exporter
that authorizes a specific export from the United states.
The term is also frequently used to include reexport
authorization that must be applied for.
"special licenses" are types of validated license
authorizing multiple transactions that are issued by BXA
92 15 C.F.R. §770.3.
93 15 C.F.R. §785.6.·
94 15 C.F.R. §§ 770.10, 799.1-·
95 15 C.F.R. § 770.5.·
96 15 C.F.R. § 770.6.·
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under procedures maintained to facilitate exports requiring
a validated license. These include the project license,
distribution license, service supply procedure, and the
97aircraft and vessel repair station procedure.
"General licenses" are licenses established by EAR
provisions for which no application is required and for
which no document is normally granted or issued. The
conditions for the use of these licenses are set out in 15
C.F.R. Part 771 for commodities and 15 C.F.R. Part 779 for
technology and software. These general licenses are not
applicable to exports under the exclusive licensing
jurisdiction of agencies other than BXA. All items subject
to BXA jurisdiction are shipped under either a general or a
validated license, with the exception of most shipments to
Canada.
D.CoCom Function.
1.The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls (CoCom)
In the aftermath of the Berlin blockade of 1948, which
represented the beginning of the cold war, the u.s.
government passed the Export Control Act and initiated
discussion with Western allies to establish embargo lists
against the U.S.S.R. and its satellite states.98 In 1949,
97 . 15 C.F.R. S 773.
98. Liebman, The Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985,
20 INT'L LAW. 367(1986).
101
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the u.s. proposed the formation of the Consultative Group,
which comprised of export control officials from various
Western nations, who were charged with supervising export
control lists containing regulated items.99 The
Consultative Group served as a policy-setting body. In 1950,
CoCom was created to execute the day-to-day embargo
d' t' 100 d d th I' k'1rec 1ve, an assume e po 1CY ma 1ng
responsibility a short time later.101 CoCom is divided
into three policy layers. The permanent secretariat,
headquartered in Paris, manages the routine operations of
the Committee. The members of the secretariat consist of
mid-level diplomats and technical specialists who meet daily
to discuss control lists, and consider applications for
exceptions to the list requirements. The mid-level Executive
Committee consists of higher-level government
representatives who meet twice a year. The supreme policy
body is composed of high-level government officials who meet
99. The Consultative Group was established by the U.S., the
U.K., France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg.
Between 1952-1953 Norway, Benmark, Canada, and West Germany
joined the Group and eventually Portugal, Greece, Turkey,
Japan and australia became members as well. See Berman &
Garson, United states Export Control-Past, Present, and
Future, 67 Colum. L.Rev. 761, 835(1976).
100. Hunt, Multilateral Cooperation in Export Control-The Role
of CoCom,14 U.Tol.L.Rev. 1285,1287(1983).
Webster, CoCom: Limitations on the Effectiveness of
Multilateral Export Controls, 1983 wis. Int'l L. J. 106,
108(1983).
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once a year to translate political decisions on licensing
rules into directives for the lower administrative
102levels. CoCom is the deliberative body, where member-
nations discussed the types of export control policies they
plan to enact in their respective nations.
2. The operation of the Committee.
Although CoCom is described as an informal "gentlemen's
agreement", the organization's infrastructure suggests that
the pact has evolved into far more than a mere forum for
informal policy making. To achieve its objectives, CoCom
divides its activities into three tasks: establishment and
updating of control lists; review of exception requests
submitted from member-states; and coordination of
enforcement and administration activities by different CoCom
103member governments.
CoCom maintains three embargo lists to guide the export
policies of its members. The lists are: International Atomic
Energy List; International Munitions List; and the
Industrial List(containing duel use items not found in the
first two lists).104 These lists are not published, and
102. Uzzi O. Raanan, For Whom the Bell Tolls--CoCom: Past,
Present, Future, 4 Transnat'l Law. 165(1991).
103 . Webster, supra note 101, at 114.
104. The International Industrial List divided into three
subcategories: embargo items (International List I);
quantitatively controlled items(International List II) and
exchange of information and surveillance items(International
List III). List I contains embargoed items which can only be
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the only information available is found in publications by
the respective member-states, once the suggestions are
codified. In the united states the list is adopted by the
Commodity Control List, which is a part of the Export
d ' . t t' 1 t' 105 I dd't' t "A mlnlS ra 10n Regu a 10ns. n a 1 10n 0 revlewlng
control lists on a regular basis, the Committee also
conducts comprehensive list reviews every three to four
106 , . d l'b t' t" tyears. Durlng reVlew e 1 era 10ns, par lclpan s
consider technological advances and availability of
particular goods and technology to controlled countries from
sources outside of CoCom member-states.107 Determination
of availability influences the future composition of control
lists.
During the high-level review procedure, each member may
submit "original proposals" up to four months in advance of
exported once permission is obtained from CoCom. List I
includes: "Metalworking machinery; chemical and petroleum
equipment; electrical and power generating equipment;
transportation equipment; electronic and precision
instruments; metals, minerals, and their manufacture;
chemicals and metalloids; petroleum products; rubber and
rubber products." Appel, The Evolution of Multilateral Export
Controls: A critic al study of the CoCom Regime, 9 Fletcher F.
105, 109 n.9. (1985). Items on List II may be exported in
limited quantities, while items on List III requires a report
to CoCom as to export and intended end use. Van Genderen,
Cooperation on Export Control Between the United states and
Europe: A cradle of conflicting Technology transfer?, 14
N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 391, 395(1989).
105 • 15 C.F.R. S 799.1 Supp. 1(1992).
106 · Hunt, supra note 101, at 1289.
107 • Id.
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the discussions, and "counterproposals" up to forty-five
days before member consideration. If two or more members
agree, "revised proposals" may be submitted at any time
during the review. Any member also may submit a "proposal
for consistency," covering changes required in order to
maintain technical consistency with other items not under
control. If an item has been used commercially in the West
for five years or more, an " original proposal" to decontrol
is considered approved unless a counterproposal is
submitted. 108
CoCom representatives also meet once a week to review
petitions made by individual businesses seeking one time
exceptions to export prohibitions. Each member-state
forwards to CoCom applications for export of controlled
items which it deems fit for export. Member-states must
review each application and respond within eighteen days.
Upon reaching a unanimous vote, CoCom issues a
recommendation to the requesting nation.109 Even when
CoCom denies an exception request, member-nations may
proceed with a sale if they determine that the transaction
is important to their "national interest.,,110 The
108 . Hunt, supra note 100; Raanan, supra note 102.
109 . CoCom does not deal directly with individual exporters.
The states must respond with a full approval, partial
approval, or denial of the request. Webster, supra note 101,
at 117-118.
110. Id.at 118 note 52.
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requirement of CoCom approval is also blunted by the
practice of member governments that allow export of some
items not submitted for CoCom's review. 111 In some
instances governments have even dealt with each other
directly, through high level channels, bypassing the CoCom
arrangement. The British government chose this method when
it decided to sell sophisticated Harrier jets to
Ch' 112lna.
CoCom also serves as a consultative forum for national
enforcement activities. To achieve this end, CoCom
established the Subcommittee on Export Control, which meets
periodically to study member-state enforcement procedures
and to suggest ways to improve security procedures.113
111. Id.
112. Id.
113 .Id. at 119.
PART III. EXPORT LICENSING SYSTEM
Generally speaking, if anyone wants to make an export
of any dual-use goods or dual-use technology, he or she is
required to obtain an export authorization from the United
States government. Such export authorization may take one of
two forms. First one is the authorization for export of
certain goods and technology specified in the Export
Administration Act (EAR).114 Any export of goods and
technology specified in the EAR is said to have a general
license. The second form of the authorization is the one
exporters have to get from the government(mostly Department
of Commerce or Department of State) agencies each time
before the shipment can be made. In order to understand the
system, it is important to know that licensing requirements
very from country groups to country groups. In this Chapter,
therefore, the discussion is focused on the deferent types
of licenses and how the license requirements are applied to
deferent country groups.
A.General License.
There are numerous general licenses, all of which are
authorization permitting export of commodities without
obtaining a written license or document from the U.S.
114 . 15 C.F.R. S 771.
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115Department of Commerce. Those most often used are as
follows:
1.G-DEST.
A general license designated G-DEST authorizes export
of any commodity listed on the Commodity Control List to any
destination for which a validated license is not required by
the information set forth in the column titled "Validated
116License Required for Country Groups Shown Below." In
other words, commodities that are not subject to validated
licensing for export to the destination country may be
shipped under General License G-DEST. The availability of
115 . Id. §771.1 Or general license is a "license" that permits
exports of commodities without a written authorization or
licensing document. No general license may be used in the
following cases:
(1) If the general license is suspended or revoked or the
export is contrary to a denial order;
(2) The exporter knows or has reason to know that the shipment
will be reexported without authorization (specific or by
regulation) from the DOC;
(3) Shipments to foreign vessels or aircraft except if they
are permitted under General License RCS and except if the
shipment can be made under a general license to the country in
which the vessel or aircraft is located, in which it is
registered, and by which it is controlled, based, or
chartered;
(4) The exporter knows that the export is destined for a use
or facility of concern from the standpoint of proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction or has been informed by BXA that
a validated license will be required because of such concern;
(5) The commodity is to be unladen from a vessel or aircraft
in, or move in transit through, country Groups Y or Z (except
as provided in 15 C.F.R. S 770.9);
(6) The commodity is a device for surreptitious interpretation
of communications; or
(7) The commodity is subject to short supply controls (subject
to certain general license exceptions).
116 . 15 C.F.R. S 771.3.
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G-DEST is determined from the applicable entry in the CCL
and will exist where (a) the commodity does not come within
the control specifications of the entry or (b) the
destination is not within a country group identified in the
"Validated License Required" section of the entry.
2.GTDA.
General License GTDAl17 permits the export of data,
regardless of the country of destination, without specific
government approval. It covers the following:
(a) Data generally available to the public in any form,
including: data released orally or visually at open
conferences or other presentations and publications that may
be purchased at a price no greater than the cost of
reproduction and distribution or that are available at
public libraries.
(b) Information resulting from fundamental research
that is ordinarily published and shared broadly within the
scientific community.
(c) Information released in course instruction in
academic institutions.
(d) Foreign origin data in a patent application sent
abroad for execution and return to the united states for a
patent filing.
3.GTDU.
117. 15 C.F.R. S 779.4(1991)(Revised, effective October 3,
1989, 54 F.R. 40,644).
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The revised CCL uses the symbol GTDU to indicate the
nearly worldwide availability of General License GTDR
without written assurance, even though the proposed revision
to EAR Part 779 containing the new GTDUl18 has not yet
been issued. A "conforming regulation", published in the
Federal Register at the end of January 1992, incorporates
into the body of the EAR some of the changes relating to
controls on technology and software exports that are
contained in the revised CCL. The conforming regulation
amends Part 779 to reflect the substance of the proposed
GTDU, but still designates it as "General License GTDR
without Written Assurance.,,119
In combination, the Core List and conforming regulation
changes to EAR Parts 779 and 799 cover the export of these
four kinds of technology and software under General License
GTDR without written assurance:
(1) Operation technical data and software;
(2) Sales technical data and software;
(3) Software updates; and
(4) Standard commercially available software.
The regulations contain detailed definitions of these items.
The eligibility of other technology and software for
export under General License GTDU is determined by reference
to the CCL. Within each of the ten categories on the revised
118 . 15 C.F.R. S 779.5.
119 . 15 C.F.R. S 779.4(B), 57 F.R •• 4553, FEB. 6, 1992.
4.GTOR.
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The revised General License GTOR moves into the
This effectively narrows the
120 . 15 C.F.R. S 779.6.
includes advice on each of the technology and software ECCNs
As noted in the preceding section, the revised CCL
indicates that neither of these general licenses is
as to the availability of General License GTOR, but is not
applicable to certain data related to nuclear commodities to
Afghanistan and China.
available, may still be exported under General License GTOR
and more clearly defines the range of technology and
.tt 120wrl en assurance.
eligible for export under old GTOR without written assurance
provides guidance as to the availability of General Licenses
software eligible for export under general license with
types listed above.
without written assurance if it qualifies as one of the four
General License GTOU category those exports previously
CCL there are five groups, designated by the letter used for
the second digit in the ECCN. Software is in group "0" and
technology is in group "E". Each ECCN in these two groups
GTOU and GTOR. Technology or software which would otherwise
remain those in Country Groups T and V, except for
requirement for written assurances. Eligible countries
require a validated license, because the applicable ECCN
51
any destination. 121 as well as data related to certain
commodities and processes listed in the EAR,122 such as
civil aircraft, airborne electronic direction finding
equipment, airborne electronic navigation and radar
equipment, hydrofoils, infrared imaging equipment,
submersible watercraft, and production process for
superalloys.
5.GFW and GCT.
General Licenses GFW and GCT are important general
licenses under which many goods are exported which are
subject to strategic trade controls. Unlike the many
"special purpose" general licenses that are based on the
transaction participants (for example, united states
agencies) or circumstances (such as aircraft on temporary
sojourn), these general licenses can apply to a broad range
of conventional commercial exports. The eligibility criteria
for these general licenses are based upon a united states
Government judgment that a certain level of strategic goods
can be exported to certain countries without the need for
DOC review and validated licensing.
Introduced by the DOC in 1987 and codified in EAA s
5(c) (5), added by S2416(c) (1) of the 1988 Trade Act,
General License GFW covers the export to most destinations
which are not CoCom proscribed countries of goods in the
121 . 15 C.F.R. S 779.4(c).
122 . 15 C.F.R. S 779.4(d).
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lower end of the control spectrum, which means some of those
which could be exported to the former U.S.S.R. at national
d' t' 'th I t'f' t' t 123 h'1scre 10n W1 on y no 1 1ca 10n 0 CoCom. T 1S
general license is not provided pursuant to a CoCom
agreement; rather, it is a United States control procedure
that uses CoCom control status as an eligibility criterion.
Commodities covered in a CCL Advisory Note as "likely to be
approved" for Country Groups Q and Yare eligible for a GFW
license to almost all countries in Groups T and V, absent
notation to the contrary. Countries designated as terrorist
supporters are excluded, and countries on the nuclear
non-proliferation special country list124 are ineligible
for a number of items otherwise covered by GFW. End-use
conditions in such a note do not apply for GFW eligibility
purposes. Although national discretion notes are in only a
minority of CCL entries, they are found in several
categories of major international trade significance, such
as computers, electronic components and communications
switching equipment. The CoCom Core List decontrols many
items that were previously covered by GFW and adds new
Advisory Notes that serve to define the items currently
covered by GFW. The exclusion of a few destinations and
certain commodities from GFW eligibility is based on foreign
policy and non-proliferation control authority, the
123 . 15 C.F.R. S 771.23.
124 . Supplement No.4 to 15 C.F.R. S 778.
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statutory decontrol requirement being limited to EAA §5
national security controls.
Introduced in June 1990, GCT extends general license
treatment for shipments to CoCom and cooperating country
destinations of all but a few CoCom-controlled items that
are partially or wholly excluded for national security or
l'f t' 125 T GCT th tnon-pro 1 era lon reasons. 0 use , e expor er
must first obtain a signed statement from the importer that
it will import the goods and not ship them outside CoCom
without prior authorization from appropriate national
authorities. The importer statement may cover a 12-month
period. other CoCom members have also been introducing
special procedures for intra-CoCom trade. The objective is
to achieve license-free intra-CoCom trade as all member
governments meet agreed standards of export control
capability. This could complement the European Community's
objective of eliminating all internal trade barriers by the
end of 1992. The united states has made Austria, Finland,
Ireland, Sweden, and switzerland eligible for GCT126
pursuant to the policy of extending this favored licensing
treatment to countries that maintain export control regimes
that meet the CoCom standard of effectiveness. In addition,
some CoCom participants have introduced a general license
125. 15. C.F.R. S 771.25.




in GCT is under review.
G-DESTi Commodity type and destinationS 771.3
for intra-CoCom trade without requiring anything comparable
to the importer statement, and the retention of this feature
inspection and testing. Commodities will generally be
The numerous general licenses available for commodity
General license G-TEMP covers the export of commodities
7.0ther General Licenses.
include those sent abroad for exhibition, demonstration,
legally exported from the united States, legally reexported,
for temporary use abroad, including use in international
127waters. Exports eligible for this general license
in the United states or abroad to send to controlled
unless they are to be consumed or destroyed in the course of
the authorized use abroad. G-TEMP may be used by companies
required to be returned to the United states within one year
parts kits, or software, to commission or service goods
or made abroad with authorized use of U.S-origin content.
128 . Id. SS 771.3 to 771.24.
127 . 15 C.F.R. S 771.22.
accompany news media personnel.
countries U.S.-origin diagnostic and test equipment, spare
G-TEMP can also be used for items that are needed by and
exports under specified conditions, and without application














involve no validated license requirement
GIT; Intransit shipments





RCS; Shipments to united States or
Canadian vessels, planes, airline
installations
§771.13 GUS; Shipments to personnel and agencies
of the United States Government
§ 771.14 GCG; Shipments to agencies of
cooperating governments
§ 771.15 GTF-U.S.; Goods imported for display at
united States exhibitions or trade fairs
§ 771.16 License G-NNR; Shipments of
certain non-Naval Reserve petroleum
GLR; Commodity return or replacement
GIFT; Shipments of gift parcels
GATS; Aircraft on temporary sojourn
GTDA and GTDR; technical data
G-TEMP; Temporary exports
GFW; Low level exports to certain
countries
§ 771.25 GCT; CoCom Trade
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§ 771.26 SAFEGUARDS; International safeguards
§ 771.27 G-NGO; commodities for humanitarian
projects in Vietnam.
B.Validated License.
As mentioned before, the export of all commodities,
technology, and software is prohibited unless a general
license or a validated license authorizes such export. If an
export is not authorized by some type of general license, a
particular type of validated license is required depending
upon the item's nature, destination and end-use. If the
export is a high technology item, it is likely to be subject
to national security and/or non-proliferation controls. Even
if the export is not a high technology item, it may be
subject to licensing because of the country of destination,
e.g. North Korea. Even if neither nature nor destination
limitations apply, the export may be subject to control
because of the end-use or the end-user, e.g. anything going
t 't' I' f d t t' 129o a proJec 1nvo v1ng weapons 0 mass es ruc 10n or
to an end-user that is sUbject to a denial order or a
temporary denial order.130
There are two basic categories of such validated
licenses: the Individual validated license and the Special
License. Both licenses authorize specific exports after an
application for the license is received. The Individual
129 . 15 C.F.R. § 785.
130. Supplements Nos. 1 and 2 to 15 C.F.R. Part 788.
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License requires written authorization each time before the
shipment of the export can be made. The Special License or
bulk license authorizes multiple shipments of export as an
alternative to the individual validated license. Presently,
there are following types of bulk licenses:
1.project License.
The project License authorizes multiple exports of
eligible commodities, technology, and software for
specified, ongoing activities for a period of one year,
subject to renewal.131 Multiple exports must be
involved; the items to be reexported must be covered by
entries on the CCL under at least two different Processing
Codes; and at least 25 individual validated licenses would
have been required but for the Project License. Following
specified activities are permitted to be involved in the
Project License procedure:
a. Substantial capital expansion of a new or existing
plant;
b. A program for supplying maintenance, repair, and
operating supplies to an existing facility; or
c. A program for supplying material to be used in the
production of other commodities for sale.
section 773.2(b) of 15 C.F.R. specifies as ineligible
for a Project License certain items (mostly nuclear related)
and destinations (embargoed and terrorist-supporting
131 . 15 C.F.R. s 773.2.
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countries), and excludes commodities intended for resale in
the form in which they are exported from the United states.
It is valid initially for one year, but an extension of two
years is possible. It can be renewed for further periods
with a completely new application. Since Project Licenses
applications are complete, they are often facilitated by
prior consultation with BXA.132
D' t 'b t' L' 1332. 1S r1 u 10n 1cense.
This procedure authorizes multiple exports and
reexports to eligible countries of certain commodities to
approved consignees under an international marketing program
for a period of two years, subject to extension and
renewal.134 The R I t' I t h' thegu a 10ns pace grea emp aS1S on e
need for license holders and their approved consignees to
establish and maintain internal control procedures designed
to assure observance of export control requirements. The
internal control program is subject to on-site review by the
Department of Commerce, and deficiencies may result in
curtailment, suspension, or revocation of a Distribution
License.
The Distribution License procedure may be used for all
countries in Country Groups T and V, except Afghanistan, the
People's Republic of China, and designated
132 · Id. § 773.2(c), (d), and (e).
133 · Id. § 773.3.
134 · Id. § 773.3(f) (3).
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terrorist-supporting countries, and (though the regulations
do not say so) for distribution through Canada to other
countries. The procedure may not be used for export or
delivery to nuclear end-users or for nuclear end uses in
countries that are not listed in either Supplements 2 or 3
to 15 C.F.R. Part 773.
Exclusions from commodity eligibility are much the same
as those noted above for the Project License, plus
commodities intended for firms controlled by
government-controlled entities of country Groups Q, S, W, Y,
or Z. Moreover, only certain eligible exporters and
consignees qualify for the Distribution License procedure.
To be eligible, an exporter must be found to be reliable,
experienced and capable with respect to export control
adherence, and shall have a reasonable expectation that the
Distribution License will replace not less than 25
individually validated export licenses in the first year. A
consignee must also be deemed reliable under the criteria in
15 C.F.R. S 773.3(c) (4) and even though it is:
a. Controlled-in-fact by the license applicant:
b. An unrelated party who has entered into a written
agreement with the license applicant to adhere to the Export
Administration Regulation and all requirements of an
approved consignee; or
c. Any other party receiving commodities under the
distribution license.
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controls to donations intended to meet basic human needs.
3. Humanitarian License Procedure.
Donors who can show the means of ensuring that
EAA § 6(g) bars the application of foreign policy based
The exporter has a duty to notify the consignee that the
The Procedure(SL) enables firms in the united states or
in 15 C.F.R. §773.3(f).
need to establish eligibility on a shipment-by-shipment
136 · Id. § 773.5.
also advise the consignee that the consignee may not sell
137 · Id. § 773.7.
u.s.-origin commodities if the consignee has reason to know
135 • Id. § 773.3(g)(3)(vi).
Currently in Effect" or other notifications, listing persons
to whom the consignee may not sell.135 The exporter must
consignee will be receiving a "Table of Denial Orders
equipment exported from the United states, produced abroad
abroad to offer prompt service for certain countries for
export qualifying commodities •
. I d 1374.Servlce Supp y Proce ure.
of the exemption while avoiding burdening donors with the
this statutory provision in a way that guards against misuse
that they will be used in nuclear weapons, etc., as provided
b . 136aS1S.
donations will in fact be used to meet basic human needs can
The Humanitarian License was developed to give effect to
receive a two-year license (renewable for two years) to
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by a united states sUbsidiary, affiliate, or branch, or by a
manufacturer who uses parts imported from united states in a
manufactured product. Ineligible commodities and
applications are specified in 15 C.F.R. § 773.7(b), with
many exclusions being proliferation related. No export or
reexport may be made under the Service supply Procedure
directly or indirectly, to Country Groups Sand Z, to
designated terrorist-supporting countries, nor to service
any equipment owned or controlled by any of these countries
or by a national thereof. There is limited availability of
the Service Supply Procedure to Country Groups Q, W, Y, and
f h 't d th I ' bl' f h' 138A g an1S an an e Peop e s Repu 1C 0 C 1na.
The following 3 types of export or reexport
authorizations are obtainable under the Service supply
Procedure:
(a) Export from the united states where --
(i) The exporter is either (A) the entity that
manufactured or exported the equipment, or (B) the parent of
a foreign subsidiary that manufactured the product;
(ii) The supply of spare parts is a normal function of
the exporter's business; and
(iii) The export is for servicing United states
equipment in the possession of a consignee.
138 . See 15 C.F.R. S 773.7(i) for special procedures.
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(b) Reexport by a Foreign Based Service Facility in
Country Groups T or V (but not the People's Republic of
China or Afghanistan) where
(i) The Service Facility is designated by the United
States exporter or manufacturer of the equipment to be
serviced, and
(ii) Servicing of such equipment is a normal function
of its business.
(c) Reexport of replacements or spares by a foreign
manufacturer located in Country Groups T or V, except
Afghanistan, that has incorporated U.s.-origin parts into
its products.
5. Aircraft and Vessel Repair station procedure.139
This is an alternative procedure for exporting aircraft
or vessel repair parts to certain destinations. It does not
eliminate the need to apply for an individual validated
license, but it greatly reduces the supporting documentation
needed for each such application. The foreign importer will
be designated an Aircraft Vessel and Repair station by BXA
and assigned a Repair station Number. The foreign importer
of the part cannot be located in Country Groups Q, S, W, Y,
Z, or Afghanistan, and cannot import for general resale. The
aircraft or vessel to be serviced cannot be controlled,
owned or leased by the government of a country in Country
139 . 15 C.F.R. § 773.8.
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Groups Q, S, W, Y, Z, Afghanistan, or any national thereof.
6 .. f . t t d140. Serv1c1ng 0 Equ1pmen Expor e
This procedure covers the export or reexport of parts
needed to service equipment previously exported or
reexported to Country Groups Q, W, or Y. This is an
individual validated license procedure, but it can be used
for multiple consignees and for up to a year's estimated
requirements under multiple shipments. The limitations on
the use of this procedure include the following:
a. servicing can only be performed on equipment that is
specifically identified in the export application.
b.Replacement parts must be identical to the parts that
were originally exported under a validated license.
c.AII parts that are removed must be either destroyed
or returned to the licensee.
d. All service kits must be in the possession of an
authorized Western representative of the applicant.
7.Recurring Shipments.
To facilitate the issuance of validated licenses for
certain other types of recurring shipments of Aircraft, Ship
Stores, and Related Supplies and Equipment, there are
special license application procedures for Aircraft and
Equipment, Parts and Accessories,141 and for Ship Stores,
140 • Id. § 776.4.
141 . Id. § 776.8.
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Plane stores, Supplies and Equipment.142 EAA §§ 5(e) (3)
(regarding national security controls) and 6(p) (regarding
foreign policy controls) restrict the authority to require a
validated license for the export of one-for-one replacement
parts for goods lawfully exported. Regulations implementing
these recent statutory changes make it unnecessary in some
instances to use the bulk licenses described in § 6(f)-(h)
above. 143
C.Countrv Group Rules.
The license requirements are mostly different from one
country group to another due to differing u.s. security
interests and foreign policies regarding particular
countries.
1. country Group Z. North Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba are
th b d t' t' 144, t 11 11 de em argo es 1na 10ns. V1r ua y a exports an
reexports to these countries require a license for foreign
policy reasons, with the following exceptions:
( ) C t ' 1 I' h' t 145a er a1n genera 1cense s 1pmen si
(b) Use of a humanitarian license procedure for
controlled distribution of donated goods for basic human
142 • Id. § 776.9.
143 · See General License GLR (Return or replacement of certain
Commodities), 15 C.F.R. S 771.17(e).
144 · 15 C.F.R. § 785.1.
145. Id. §§ 771 and 779.
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needs: health, food, clothing, shelter, and education;146
and
(c) PUblications, recordings, and films.147
The licensing policy is to deny all applications
except: (a) Case-by-case decisions on non-commercial exports
to meet humanitarian or emergency needs; (b) For Cuba only,
insubstantial amounts of united states content in foreign
produced items if such is consistent with host government
policy (20% U.S. content is usually considered
"insubstantial"); and (c) For North Korea only, commercially
supplied goods to meet basic human needs may be authorized
under an individual validated license. Be aware that
Treasury regulations may apply to the transaction, even
though the EAR may not.
2. Country Groups Q, W, and Y.
The countries that formerly belonged to the Warsaw
Pact, Albania, The Mongolian People's Republic, and Laos,
along with the People's Republic of China are subject to
CoCom-agreed controls on national security grounds under EAA
S 5. The national security licensing policy for these
destinations is one of approval if BXA determines that the
export is for a civilian use or would otherwise not be
d' I 't d t t t' I 't 148etr1menta to Un1 e S a es na 10na secur1 y.
146 . Id. S 773.5.
147. ECCN DA98I.
148 . 15 C.F.R. S 785.2(a) (1).
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Exports to these countries of CoCom-controlled commodities
(ECCN with suffix "A") require review and approval in CoCom,
unless they are covered by a "likely to be approved" or
"favorable consideration" notation in the ECCN which,
respectively, indicates that they are licensable at national
discretion or licensable after notice to CoCom if no
objection is raised within a specified period.
In June 1990 CoCom agreed to a "special procedure" for
export to Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (Country Group
W) due to their pOlitical changes and their commitment and
ability to safeguard sensitive exports. All but a very few
CoCom controlled items can now go to these countries under
either the favorable consideration procedure (presumption of
approval and no review in CoCom unless specially requested
during "30-day notice period) or the administrative
exception procedure (licensing at national discretion, with
no need for prior notice to CoCom).
3. Country Group T & V.
Most exports to most free world destinations can be
made under some form of general license. Important
exceptions are nonproliferation controls and a few sensitive
items, and certain destinations in Country Group V.
Moreover, The export of items controlled for national
security reasons to a destination other than Canada requires
a validated license unless a "special circumstances" general
license applies. These include CoCom-controlled items, as
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well as certain items that are unilaterally controlled by
the united states to all destinations. Changes in BXA
controls in recent years have tended to confine validated
licensing requirements to exports going to countries of
concern or to particularly sensitive items. The latest
nonproliferation controls have gone counter to this trend to
some extent.
The pertinent licensing policy for such applications
"generally is one of approval of applications unless there
is a significant risk that the commodities or data will be
used or diverted contrary to the objectives of a specific
149u.s. export control program." Within country Groups T
and V, Supplements 2, 3, and 8 to 15 C.F.R. Part 773
identify particular countries to which exports are less
restricted under certain EAR provisions. Supplement 2
consists of CoCom countries, New Zealand, and Iceland, and
Supplement 8 lists other countries that have established the
ability to safeguard the reexport of U.S.-origin goods. The
listing is currently limited to Austria, Finland, Ireland,
Sweden, and Switzerland. More sensitive commodities can be
shipped to these countries under a distribution license
(DL). Supplement 3 lists a large "second tier" group of
countries eligible, for example, to receive more advanced
computers under a DL than can go to the remaining countries
in Groups T and V.
149. Id. § 78S.4(g)(l)(iii).
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Countries.
and consistent united States foreign policy.
Part 785 for
The export or reexport of any commodities to
See Supplement No. 2 to 15 C.F.R.
interpretation of "police or military."
151 . 15 C.F.R. s 785.4(a) (3).
152
A number of additional requirements are applicable to
150 . See Supplement No. 2 to 15 C.F.R. Part 779.
4. Special Licensing Requirements for certain T and V
Shipments to Afghanistan are subject to the same
To implement the united Nations arms embargo of exports
the data are intended for the police or military or the
direct product of the data is intended for such
of non-public technical data requires a validated license if
1, 1511.cense.
military items, including equipment for their
manufacture. 150 Related technical data require a
consideration of validated licenses for medical or
t· h" k' 1 d t 152an 1.- 1.Jac 1.ngre ate expor s. An export or reexport
the police or military is embargoed, except for favorable
to the Republic of South Africa, licenses are required for
licensing policy for national security items is to deny if
licensing requirements as those to the U.S.S.R. The
controlled items may be approved if for the Afghan economy
the shipment would be denied to the U.S.S.R. Foreign policy
shipments to certain countries in Country Groups T & V.
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entities.153 In Executive Order 12,769 of July 10, 1991,
the President determined that the conditions set in the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 had been met and
ordered the lifting of controls imposed pursuant to that
Act.154 Controls to be terminated include the
prohibition on crude oil and petroleum product exports, the
licensing requirement for computer exports to all South
African Government agencies, and the presumption of denial
of all nuclear-related exports.
Syria and Iran have been designated by the Secretary of
State as supporters of international terrorism,155 and
BXA has imposed related export controls under the EAA § 6
f' I' t 1 th 't 156 I . t ' ,ore1gn po 1CY con ro au or1 y. nconS1S enC1es 1n
the scope and terms of these controls with respect to the
two countries are to be eliminated initially through
harmonized entries in the CCL revision issued to implement
the CoCom Core List. Validated licenses are required on
antiterrorism grounds for exports or CoCom controlled
dual-use items, including aircraft and vehicles, that could
contribute to military or terrorism-support capability.
Further foreign-policy based controls were imposed in 1987
with respect to exports to Iran on grounds other than its
153. 15 C.F.R. S 779.4(e) (1991); § 785.4(a) (3).
154 · 56 Fed. Reg. 31,855 (July 12, 1991).
155 · EAA § 6(j); 55 Fed. Reg. 37,793 (Sept. 13, 1990).
156 · 15 C.F.R. § 785.4(d).
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t f t ,157, t t th PI'suppor 0 errorlsm. ln con ras, e eop e s
Democratic Republic of Yemen had been subject to
antiterrorism controls, but these were dropped following
that country's integration into the new Republic of Yemen,
which the Secretary of State has not designated as a
terrorist-supporting country. Further foreign-policy based
controls were imposed in 1987 with respect to exports to
I d th th 't t f t ,158ran on groun s 0 er an 1 s suppor 0 errorlsm.
For exports and reexports to Iraq, the provisions of
the EAR have been supplanted by the embargo imposed under
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act following
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and by the Treasury Office of
Foreign Assets Control implementing regulations and
licenses. 159 Iraq has been designated a terrorist
-supporting country,160 and would be subjected to
antiterrorism controls if it is still so designated when the
embargo gives way to selective licensing of exports.
5. Country Group S: Libya.
157 52 Fed Reg. 37,756(Oct.1, 1987) (Scuba and related
equipment); 52 Fed.Reg. 45,309 (Nov. 27, 1987) (a variety of
non-military items useful for Iran's military activities) .
158 • 52 Fed. Reg. 37,756 (Oct. 1, 1987) (Scuba and related
equipment); 52 Fed. Reg. 45,309 (Nov. 27, 1987) (a variety of
non-military items useful for Iran's military activities) .
159 · 31 C.F.R. Part 575.
160 · 55 Fed. Reg. 37,793 (Sept. 13, 1990).
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The Treasury Department Libyan Sanctions Regulations
161 promulgated in 1986 under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act impose a broad ban on direct or indirect
exports from the united States to Libya. DOC regulations
applicable to exports to Libya remain in force, but to avoid
d 1· t· 1 d 162 ·d th tup 1ca 10n a DOC Genera Or er prov1 es a a
license from Treasury shall also constitute authorization
under DOC regulations. However, Treasury regulations do not
bar certain exports (not petroleum or petrochemical related)
involving substantial transformation in third
countries,163 but such exports and reexports still
require application to and authorization by DOC.164
6. Canada.
The general policy is to permit shipments to Canada for
consumption or use there without a license, either validated
165or general. When the items are transiting Canada or
are intended for reexport from Canada to another foreign
destination and such shipment would require a validated
license if it were made directly from the united States to
that country, an export license or reexport authorization is
required. Applications are then reviewed under policies
161 31 C.F.R. S 550.·
162 15 CFR S 790.7.·
163 31 C.F.R. S 550.409.·
164 15 C.F.R. SS 785.7, 790.7.·
165 Id. S 785.6.·
applicable to shipments to that country. Licenses are
required for exports to Canada of technology related to
t 'l d't' d t' 't' 166 dcer aln nuc ear commo 1 les an ac lVl les. an
167maritime nuclear propulsion plants. other licensing
requirements may be specifically noted on the CCL.
166. rd. § 779.4(c).
167• rd. §779.4(e).
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PART VI. EXTRATERRITORIAL CONTROL: REEXPORT CONTROL
A. Scope of the Reexport Prohibition without
Authorization.
u.S. reexport control is designed to make the u.S.
export control system effective. The objective of reexport
prohibitions, therefore, is to prohibit firms from
indirectly exporting to destinations and end users that may
not be served by direct exports from the united States.
The term "reexport" in the EAR,168 or any license,
order, or export control document issued thereunder,
includes reexport, transshipment, or diversion of
commodities or technical data from one foreign destination
to another. The Bureau of Export Administration ("BXA") has
made clear that the phrase "from one foreign destination to
another" means from one foreign country to another.169 In
the absence of a written reexport authorization or
permissive reexport, the EAR prohibit the:
a. Reexport of commodities previously exported from the
United States (Section 774.1(a» and the export from the
United States with knowledge the commodities will be
168 . Id. § 770.2.
169 OEL Insider, Vol. NO.4, p. 2 (October, 1989. Pub.
Office of Export Licensing, U.S. Department of Commerce).
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reexported to country other than the first country or export
(Section 774.1(b».
b. Reexport of technical data imported from the united
States (Section 779.8(a) (1» and the export from the United
States with knowledge the technical data will be reexported
to a country other than the first country of export (Section
779.8(a) (2».
c. Reexport of U.S. origin parts, components,
materials, or other commodities incorporated abroad into a
foreign-made product(Section 776.12).
d. Reexport of foreign-produced direct product of U.S.
technical data requiring a written assurance (Section
779.8(a) (3».
B.U.S. Commodities and Technoloqy.
Unless the reexport of a commodity previously exported
from the united States has been specifically authorized in
writing by the Office of Export Licensing prior to its
reexport, or is authorized under the permissive reexport
provisions of section 774.2, or is otherwise authorized
under any other provision of the EAR, no person in a foreign
country (including Canada) or in the United States may
reexport such commodity directly or indirectly, in whole or
in part, from the authorized country(ies) of ultimate
destination, or export such commodity from the united States
with the knowledge that it is to be reexported, directly or
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indirectly, in whole or in part, from the authorized
country (ies) of ultimate destination.170
The duty to disclose the reexport is on the export
license applicant who knows of the reexport even if the
reexport will be by an unrelated consignee. The failure of
the exporter to honor this duty does not relieve the
reexporter from the duty to obtain written reexport
authorization. The foreign reexporter is relieved from the
duty to obtain written reexport authorization only if the
export license grants specific reexport authority to the
ultimate country of destination. This duty also applies to
the exporters under a general license. Therefore, export
under a general license to country "A" requires that the
171exporter does not have knowledge or reason to
know172 that his consignee will reexport the item without
obtaining required written reexport authorization. Moreover,
the exporter may not export under a general license or
export to Canada without a validated or general license if
at the time of the export he has knowledge or reason to know
the item will be exported without proper authorization.
The prohibitions against reexports of technology and
software are identical to the prohibitions applicable to
170 · 15 C.F.R. S 774.1.
171 · Id. S 774.1(b).
172 · Id. S 787.4.
release of unpublished, controlled technical data and treat
Reexports of u.s. origin parts, components, materials,
There have been many changes in the rule regarding the
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In addition, they also apply to the
home country of the foreign national. However, the deemed
C.Foreiqn-made Products Incorooratinq u.s. Parts and
d't' 173commo 1 1es.
such releases to foreign aliens as deemed exports to the
or other commodities incorporated abroad into a foreign-made
Comoonents.
minimis value exclusion from the reexport control, and the
of the EAR. There are two import issues as to whether
export rule for technical data does not apply to permanent
'd t I' 174reS1 en a 1ens.
product are subject to u.s. export controls under § 776.12
other is the term "incorporated" itself.
or components in the past several years. until 1987, the
23, 1987, Commerce published its final rule amending Section
174 . Id. § 779.1(b) and (c).
made item subjected the foreign made item--such as an
173 . Id. § 779.8(a) (1) and (2).
reexport controls apply to a specific case. One is the de
parts and components rule prohibited the reexport of all
airplane or computer--to the reexport prohibitions. On March
until that time, even one U.S.-origin screw in a foreign
foreign items regardless of the value of the u.s. content.
reexports of foreign-made products incorporated u.s. parts
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776.12 175 and provided that the prohibition would not
apply to foreign made products incorporating u.s. parts,
components or commodities:
a. For reexports to a country listed in Supplement Nos.
2 and 3 to Part 373 (but not including Ethiopia, Lebanon, and
Nicaragua), if the u.S. content was 25% or less than the
value of the foreign made commodity.
b. For reexports to all other destinations, if the u.S.
content was 10% or less than the value of the foreign made
commodity and the absolute value of the u.S. content was
$10,000 or less.
Congress codified a form of the de minimis exclusion
from the scope of the rule in the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, which amended Section
5(a) (5) (A) of the EAA. Under this amendment, DOC is
prohibited from imposing reexport controls for national
security reasons under each of the two following if the u.S.
controlled content of the foreign-made item is at or below
the 25% de minimis level, or all the u.S. content is at or
below the Administrative Exceptions Note ("AEN") level
without regard to any percentage of u.S. content
incorporated into the foreign made commodity.
currently, the reexport of foreign-made items are
excluded from the prohibition if they meet anyone of the
following criteria:
175 . 52 C.F.R. 9147 (1987), then numbered 376.12.
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a.U.S. content that could be exported to the new
destination under General license G-DEST or G-
CoCom.
b.Incorporate u.s. content valued at 10% or less.
c.Incorporate u.s. controlled content valued at
25% or less and the ultimate destination of the
foreign-made items is not a destination in country
group Sand Z, Iran and Syria. (in calculating u.s.
controlled content, do not include items that may
be exported under G-DEST, G-CoCom, or GFW to the
new country of destination).
d.None of the u.s. content exceed the upper limits
of the AEN level, i.e. the Advisory Notes in the
CCL that indicate licenses that are likely to be
approved to Country Groups Q, W, and Y.
There are about three theories that help determine
whether a particular U.S.-origin part, component or
commodity is "incorporated" into a foreign-made item.176
The first theory is that the u.s. item is essential to the
operation of the foreign made item. For example, a power
supply is "incorporated" into a foreign made item if the
foreign made item will not operate or perform its intended
functions without the power supply. Commerce did not intend
176 . Larry E. Christensen, Reexport Control Under the EAR,
Coping with U.S. Export Controls 1.992, Commercial Law and
Practice Course Handbook Series.
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this to be the only standard that would enable one to
conclude a u.s. item is "incorporated". DOC clearly intended
that the term "incorporated", as that term is used in
section 776.12, to be more encompassing. The disk drive
example can verify this conclusion because a computer can
operate without a hard disk drive.
The second theory is that the u.s. item is firmly
affixed to the foreign made item. Once again, the above disk
drive example illustrates this theory. A disk drive affixed
with four screws to the central processing unit is affixed.
A similar disk drive that is merely rack mounted or cable
connected is not affixed to the computer.
The third theory is that the u.s. item visually looses
its independent identity. Of the three theories, this is the
least instructive, least objective, and least compelling.
Nonetheless, it too has ~ basis in the regulation; and it is
often the first theory described by the Commerce staff in
response to questions regarding the term "incorporated". In
essence, this standard is met if the u.s. item is not
visibly recognized as a separate product by one viewing the
foreign made product. Once again, the hard disk drive within
the computer box illustrates the theory.
D.Foreiqn Produced Direct Product of u.s. Technical
Data.
section 779 of the EAR covers the requirements
regarding export and reexport of technical data. According
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the requirement, unless specifically authorized by the
Office of Export Licensing, or otherwise authorized under
the provisions of Section 779.8(b), no person in the united
States or in a foreign country may export or reexport to
Country Group Q, S, W, Y, or Z, the People's Republic of
China or Afghanistan, any foreign-produced item which is a
direct product of U.S. technical data, or any commodity
produced by any plant or major component thereof which is a
direct product of U.S. technical data, if such direct
product or commodity is covered by the provisions of section
779 .4 (f) or 779. 5 (e) (1) or (2) .177
The prohibition is limited to destinations in Country
Group Q, S, W, Y, Z, the PRC and Afghanistan. The so-called
"Free World" destinations in Country Group T and V (other
than the PRC) are not the subject of the foreign-produced
direct product prohibition. For example, if technical data
is exported to Taiwan ~der a written assurance and the
technical data is the design of a computer classified under
ECCN 4A01A, there is no prohibition on the reexport of that
computer to Australia because Australia, of course, is not
in Country Group Q, S, W, Y, Z, the PRC or Afghanistan.
However, an indirect export to a controlled country via
Australia is prohibited absent a general or validated
license.
177 . 15 C.F.R. S 779.8.
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E.permissive Reexport.
Permissive reexport authorizations are granted by
section 774.2 of the EAR. Generally, this section
incorporates most general licenses by reference and
authorizes permissive reexports under the same terms and
conditions. It authorizes such reexports without the
reexporter obtaining prior written reexport authorization
from the Office of Export Licensing. Permissive reexport
authorization for technical data and software is provided
under Section 779.8(b). This section incorporates General
Licenses GTDA and GTDR and extends those authorities to
reexports. A detailed discussion of general licenses is
beyond the scope of this article, but the practitioner
should remember to examine the scope of the reexport
prohibitions before examining the availability of the
permissive reexports.
permissive reexport authority is available to overcome
the reexport prohibition against reexports to the controlled
countries. For example, mUltilaterally controlled technical
data is exported to Taiwan under a written assurance. The
technical data is then used abroad to produce unembargoed
computers that may be exported under General License G-DEST
from the united States to China. Such computers may be
reexported from their production plant in Taiwan to China
under the permissive reexport authority of section 774.2.
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It is important to explain that General License GATS
(. ft t ') 178 .t ta1rcra on emporary sOJourn perm1 s reexpor seven
though it is not explicitly incorporated into section 774.2.
In practical terms, General License GATS defines temporary
journeys that do not constitute reexports and therefor do
not require reexport authorization if all the terms of
General License GATS are met.
178 • Id. § 771.19.
PART V. TECHNOLOGY AND SOFTWARE CONTROLS
A.Structure of Technology and Software Controls.
Before 1991, technical data and software were covered
by the various provisions of the section 779 of the EAR.
Consequently if an exporter was to export a commodity and
its relevant technical data or software, he had to go
through the provisions of Section 779 as well as the CCL
commodity entry. In 1991, the u.S. implementation of the so-
called Core List exercise decisions by CoCom integrated
technology and software licensing requirements into the CCL
effective on September 1, 1991. The structure of the
controls is now almost identical to the structure for
commodity controls. Exporters may classify their items
themselves without requesting a classification from the
Bureau of Export Administration(BXA).
All technology, software, and commodities are on the
CCL. The controls on technology and software are now based
on the commodities and equipments to which such technology
and software relate. For example, Category 3 on the Core
List is the category of integrated circuit and semiconductor
products. within that Category, Group 3D imposes controls
179on software, such as CAD software, specially designed




for the development or production of semiconductors; and
Group 3E controls technology for development, production or
use of controlled semiconductors, manufacturing and testing
. t d t . I 180 h h'equ1pmen an ma er1a s. T e CCL covers t e ent1re
economy except those items properly within the export
control jurisdiction of another federal agency. The proper
CCL entry or ECCN for an item may be a general entry for
items not elsewhere specified ("n.e.s."), such as those
ECCNs ending with the letter "G." In addition, the General
Technology and General Software Notes at the Supplement 2 to
the CCL explain the scope of technology and software
controls for all control reasons.
B. The General Technoloav Note.
For years COCOM relied upon a General Technology Note
("GTN") that was not published in the EAR. For the most
part, COCOM used the GTN.to control technology related to
commodities described on the various COCOM lists until
September 1, 1991. There were, however, exceptions in COCOM
to the general rule and those were described in various
The Core List adds a new Supplement No. 2 to section
779.1 of the Export Administration Regulations which explains
the extent to which controls are imposed on technology for the
development, production or use of controlled equipment and
materials. Under this new Supplement NO.2, which codifies
the COCOM General Technology Note, technology is subject to
export controls if it is required for the development,
production or use of controlled equipment, as specified in the
Core List, even if such technology may also be used for the
development, production or use of equipment that is not
subject to validated export licensing requirements for exports
to all destinations, except the embargoed countries.
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entries. During the Core List exercise, COCOM redrafted the
GTN as it applied to the Industrial List and agreed that all
COCOM members should publish it along with the list of items
181controlled. COCOM also negotiated and redrafted
certain definitions that are essential to an understanding
of the scope of the COCOM controls. This GTN is implemented
in the CCL. It is applicable thus far to all entries on the
CCL regardless of the reason for control. The GTN as
implemented in Supplement 2 to the CCL provides in relevant
part:
The export of "technology" that is "required" for
the "development", "production", or "use" of
products on the Commerce Control List is
controlled according to the provisions in each
Category.
"Technology" "required" for the "development",
"production", or "use" of a controlled product
remains controlled even when applicable to a
product controlled at a lower level.
General License GTDR, without written assurance,
is available for "technology" that is the minimum
necessary for the installation, operation,
181. The complete GTN for the COCOM Industrial List is as
follows:
The export of "technology" which is "required" for the
"development", "production" or "use" of products embargoed in
the International Industrial List is controlled according to
the provisions in each Category.
"Technology" "required" for the "development",
"production" or "use" of a product under embargo remains under
embargo even when applicable to any unembargoed product.
Controls do not apply to that "technology" which is the
minimum necessary for the installation, operation, maintenance
(checking) and repair of those products which are unembargoed
or whose export has been authorized. This does not release the
repair technology embargoed by ECCN 8E2a. Controls do not
apply to "technology" "in the public domain" or to "basic
scientific research".
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maintenance (checking), and repair of those
products that are eligible for General Licenses or
t~at are1S~ported under a validated export
11cense.
The GTN provides that technology is controlled
"according to the provisions of each Category." This means
that a given ECCN may incorporate all or a portion of the
potential scope of technology controls captured by the terms
used in the GTN. Therefore, the definitions of the terms are
important, and the word "required" is most important.
"Required" as applied to technology, refers to only
that portion of "technology" which is peculiarly responsible
for aChieving or exceeding the embargoed performance levels,
characteristics or functions. Such "required" "technology"
may be shared by different products. COCOM adopted the term
"required" to more precisely define the scope of know-how
subject to the controls. In effect, the term captures
individual items of know-how that are both necessary and
sufficient to achieve the performance parameter of the
commodity used to define the scope of the technology entry.
COCOM specifically recognizes that controlled technology
remains controlled even if it can be used and is used to
182 • This does not allow release under a general license of
the repair "technology" controlled by 1E02. e, 1E02. f, 7E03, or
8E02. a. And the "minimum necessary" excludes "development" or
"production" technology and permits "use" technology only to
the extent "required" to ensure safe and efficient use of the
product. Individual ECCNs may further restrict export of
"minimum necessary" information. The modification was made at
56 Fed. Reg. 67171, 67174 (December 30, 1991) to extend this
authority for operation technical data related to a product,
inCluding software, exported under any general license.
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develop or produce uncontrolled items. Moreover,
"technology" "required" for the "development", "production",
or "use" of a controlled product remains controlled even
when applicable to a product controlled at a lower level.
The third paragraph of the GTN is the CoCom equivalent
to operation technical data authority, which excludes such
data from validated license controls. As defined in that
Note, "operation technical data" is the minimum technology
necessary for the installation, operation,183 maintenance
(checking), and repair of those products that are eligible
for general licenses, or that are exported under a validated
export license. The "minimum necessary" standard here
excludes from "operation technical data" development or
production technical technology, but includes use technology
only to the extent that it is required to ensure safe and
efficient use of the authorized exported product. Individual
entries in the software and technology subcategories of the
CCL may further restrict export of "minimum necessary"
technical data. (See Supplement Nos. 2 and 3 to S 799.1 of
this subchapter for further information and definitions of
the terms "development", "production", "use", and
"required".) However, sales technical data, which is defined
as data supporting a prospective or actual quotation, bid,
or offer to sell, lease, or otherwise supply any item
controlled by the EAR, may be exported under GTDR, without
183 . 57 F.R. 4553, 4564-65 (Feb. 6, 1992).
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written assurances, provided that the technical data is a
type customarily transmitted with a prospective or actual
quotation, bid, or offer in accordance with established
business practice; and the export will not disclose the
detailed design, production, or manufacture, or the means of
reconstruction, of either the quoted item or its product.
The purpose of this limitation is to prevent disclosure of
technical data so detailed that the consignee could use the
t h' I d t' d t' 184ec n1ca a a 1n pro uc 10n.
C. The General Software Note.
The General Software Note ("GSN") applies to all
categories in the COCOM Industrial List. As implemented in
Supplement 2 to section 799.1 of the CCL, it prevails over
all entries on the CCL and provides General License GTDR,
without written assurance, for mass-market software that is
generally available to the public by being sold from stock
at retail selling points, without restriction, by means of
over the counter transactions; mail order transactions; or
telephone call transactions; as well as designed for
installation by the user without further substantial support
by the supplier.
The theory underlying the GSN is that there is a subset
of software that is so widely available to the general
public that it is uncontrollable and therefore the COCOM
governments should not impose an unmanageable control burden
184 . 15 C.F.R. 779.4(b) (2).
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on the firms subject to such controls. To qualify for GSN
treatment, software must be generally available to the
public, and this is one of the three key limitations on
eligibility for GSN exclusion from controls. The software
must be held out to the public as available. This element is
not satisfied if software is marketed only through a system
that prequalifies the customer or provides advice and
assistance in the form of systems configuration. For
example, a given firm might negotiate a $1,000,000 software
development and licensing agreement over several years and
then close the sale or license by an exchange of letters. Of
course, that is not a mail order transaction within the
meaning of the GSN. Similarly, firms engage in a wide
variety of negotiations for sales or licenses that are
concluded via telephone or FAX. Such contracts are not of
the type referred to in the GSN as "telephone call
transactions". A firm may qualify for GSN treatment,
however, if it has its own telephone mail order system with
telephones answered by persons who merely take orders and
fill them. If a firm has a group of engineers who answer the
telephone and help configure systems of controlled products
for the caller, this does not qualify for GSN treatment.
The second key limitation for GSN treatment is that the
software must be sold "from stock". For this reason,




The third key limitation is that the software must be
designed for user installation. In Keeping this part, the
user is not the head of a large management information
system in a large company. Rather, the user is that person
in the firm who will sit at a terminal and use the software
15 C.F.R. 779.4(b) (1).
not as computer or software expert or specialist but as a
consumer of the functions delivered by the software. For
example, the user of computer-aided design software is the
design engineer and not the head of the computer systems
department.
According to related regulations, operation software
may be exported under GTDR, without assurance, provided that
the operation software is the minimum necessary to operate
the equipment authorized for export; and the operation
software is in object code.185 Software updates that are
intended for and are limited to correction of errors may
185
also be exported under the GTDU, provided the updates are
being exported to the same consignee and do not enhance the
functional capacities of the initial software package.18G
D.Steps Toward Exoortinq Technoloqy and Software.
With the publication of the CCL on August 29, 1991,
technology and software license requirements are described
in the CCL for the first time. Thus, the first step in
determining licensing requirements is to classify the
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technology or software by finding it on the CCL. Then one
can look to see if there is any general license available.
However, GTDA is the only general license that may be
considered before classifying an item (technology, software,
or commodities) and the only general license that is
available to all destinations, all end users, and all end
uses.
If first classified the technology or software, the next
step is to examine GTDA. If the ECCN for the technology or
software indicates "General License GTDU: yes," then this
technology and software may be exported to all countries
except Country Groups Sand Z and (under the relevant
Treasury regulations) Iraq, without a validated license and
without obtaining a written assurance of the type referred
to at section 779.4(f). Eligibility for GTDU is thus driven
by the CCL license provisions. It is imperative to realize,
however, that there are five different authorities or means
to qualify under General License GTDU. The authority
discussed above is granted on the face of the ECCN. This
authority is referred to as the "list-driven" GTDU. The
other four authorities or means to qualify under General
License GTDU are operation technology, sales technology,
software updates, and mass-market software, which have been
discussed above.
If the intended software or technology enjoys the
"list-driven" GTDU, then this general license may be used.
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It is not necessary to go on to examine operation technology
or sales technology authority. This is true regardless of
the nature of the export transaction. For example, under
ECCN 4E96G, technical data may be exported under GTDU.
Assume the plan is to disclose this technology to a foreign
firm during a sales presentation but the technology does not
qualify for sales technical data authority because detailed
information will be provided that is not customarily provide
to potential domestic customers. Under these circumstances,
"list-driven" GTDU is available regardless of the fact that
the disclosure of the technology would not qualify for sales
technical data authority, which is a separate distinct
authority or means of qualifying for General License GTDU.
Even though the export will take place within the context of
a sales presentation, it is not necessary to qualify for
sales technical data authority. This is a rational result
because GTDU is available for an outright sale of the
technology and an export in the context of a sales
presentation should not be subject to more restrictive
export treatment. Exporters, however, occasionally reach the
opposite, incorrect conclusion. Such incorrect conclusions
can be avoided by going down the decision tree until a
general license is established and then going no further.
If the ECCN for the technology or software indicates
"General License GTDU: no," then this technology and
software may not be exported under the list-driven authority
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of GTDU. However, is it appropriate go on to determine
whether the export qualifies for GTDU or GTDR without
written assurance for sales technical data (779.4(b) (2)),
operation technical data (779.4(b) (1)), software updates
(779.4(b) (3), or mass-market software (General Software Note
at Supplement 2 of the CCL). DOC intends that such
mass-market software may be exported GTDU to all
destinations except country Groups Sand Z and the South
African police and military, but the country scope of GTDU
for mass-market software requires clarification on the face
of the regulations. All these conclusions would be clearer
if only there were a separate general license for each
separate authority. In fact, one major corporation has
recommended this. Unfortunately, this outcome is unlikely
because some exporters have criticized the proliferation of
general licenses. Nonetheless, these five different
authorities under GTDU and GTDR without written assurance
are each separate and distinct authorizations to export, and
exporters must view them as such to take full advantage of
their rights under the EAR and to develop proper compliance
programs.
General License G-TEMP is the only general license
currently available for both commodities and software. For
that reason, exporters may overlook G-TEMP when planning
compliance programs for the marketing of software, even then
G-TEMP can be an effective general license for software
187
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marketing and other purposes. In summery, exporters should
engage in the following to process exports of technology and
software:
1. Classify the technology and software to be
exported. All technology and all software is on
the CCL in some entry.
2. Determine the applicability of General License
GTDA at 779.3.
3. From the proper ECCN entry on the CCL,
determine the availability o~ General License
GTDU.(General License GTDR without written
187assurance).
4. For software, determine the availability of
mass-market software authority at the General
Software Note in Supplement 2 of the CCL.
5. Determine the availability of sales technical
data authority at 779.4(b) (2).
6. Determine the availability of operation
technical data and software authority at
779.4(b) (1) and the third paragraph of the General
Technology Note at Supplement 2 to Part 779.
General Licenses GTDR with written assurance, GTDR
without written assurance (GTDU), and validated licenses may
not be used contrary to the provisions of 778.7(C) and
778.8(c), which prohibit exports for end-uses related to the
design, development, production, or use of certain missiles
and end-uses related to the design, development, production,
stockpiling, or use of chemical or biological weapons
respectively. Such prohibitions do not apply to General
License GTDA.
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7. Determine the availability of software update
authority at 779.4(b) (3).
8. Determine the availability of General License
G-TEMP for software at 771.22.
9. Determine the availability of GTDR with written
assurance at the proper entry on the CCL.
10. If no general license is available, obtain a
validated license before making the physical
export or disclosing the technology or source code
t f 't' l188o a ore1gn na 10na .
188 . christensen, Technology and Software Controls, Corporate
Law and Practice Course Handbook 1992
PART VI. U.S. EXPORT CONTROL TO P.R.C.
In the past decade, China has been economically the
fastest growing country in the world, and the trade with the
U.S. has been playing an important role. There still,
however, exist many concerns about the export regulations to
China.
A. The Development of US Export control to China.
Before World War II, the united States maintained an
open door policy toward China, as a result, and was the
189dominant trading partner rivaled only by Japan. When,
however, the Chinese Communist Party and Mao came into power
in 1949, the strong trade relationship with China was
terminated abruptly since the U.S. saw the new-born P.R.C.
as a threat to the West and U.S. interests. the U.S., in
effect, placed China in the same category as the Soviet
Union and other "Soviet Bloc" countries. 190 In 1952, the
U.S. and its allies created a separate committee(ChinCom} to
189. Japan surpassed the U.S. in exporting the China only
after conquering China's coastal provinces in 1938. Even then,
Japan tailed the U.S. in importing from China. After World War
II and Japan's surrender, the United States again emerged as
China's dominant trading partner. Lee and McCobb, uni ted
.states Trade Embargo on China, 1949-1970: Legal status and
Future Prospects, 4 N.Y.U.J.INT'L.L.& POL. 1, 2.
190. Lee and McCobb, Id. at 4.
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multilaterally control exports to China.191 Export
controls by ChinCom were considerably more restrictive than
controls by CoCom, which became known as the "China
Differential.,,192 In 1957, however, the u.s. allies
193formally incorporated ChinCom into CoCom, thereby
abandoning the "China Differential". The united states,
nevertheless, maintained its "China Differential" policy
into the 1970s. Throughout the 1950s, the 1960s and most of
the 1970s, the United states essentially shut the door to
the china, by having the Commerce Department require a
validated licensing application for all goods to
Ch' 1941na.
Two changes by the u.s. ended its close door policy to
China. First, the pressure from u.s. businesses made
Congress replaced the 1949 Act with 1969 Act, which lifted
the prohibition of exporting goods that would contribute to
the economic potential of controlled foreign
countries.195 Secondly, the Nixon Administration made
191 • Id. at 8.
192. Meese, Export Control to China: An Emerging Trend for
Dual-Use Exports, 7 INT'L TRADE L.J. 20, 23 (1981-82)
193 · Id.
194 · Lee and McCobb, supra note 189.
195. Branting, Reconciliation of Conflicting Goals in the
Export Administration Act of 1979--A Delicate Balance, 12
L.& POL. INT'L.BUS. 415, 419 (1980).
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significant diplomatic efforts to reopen the door to
h' 196 tl th f'C 1na. Consequen y, e status 0 Ch1na became
similar to that of the "Soviet Bloc" countries.197
Despite the 1969 Act and Nixon Administration detente
efforts, the "China Differential" was not completely
eradicated.
As Congress promulgated the 1979 Act in September 1979,
China was placed by the implementing EAR in the same group
as the Soviet Bloc countries. Hence, the licensing
procedures and control for China became identical to that
for the Soviet Bloc countries. In 1980, the u.S. finally
abandoned the "China Differential" policy, when the Commerce
Department removed China from the "Soviet Bloc" group Y to a
new country group P specially designed to distinguish China
from other communist countries.198 The removal of China
from Soviet Bloc group was ostensibly nothing more than
sYmbolic at that time, because the licensing requirements
for exports to China seemed to remain unchanged. 199
Nevertheless, the new status later did prove to be of some
196 · Jenkings, Dealing with Chinese, 5 INT'L TRADE L.J. 27
(1979-80).
197 · Meese, supra note 192, at 23; Lee and McCobb, supra note,
at 10-15.
198. Effective April 25, 1980, China was removed from country
group Y to country group P. China was the only country in this
newly created country group. 45 F.R. 27,922(1980).
199 · Meese, supra note 192, at 31.
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significance. In the early 1980s, the Carter Administration
relaxed export guidelines to the China to the point of
allowing exportation of civilian goods with potential
military applications unless the government could show cause
why such exports should not be allowed.200 This
relaxation to China, while maintaining strict export
controls to the Soviet Bloc countries, became known as the
"China preferential".201
The "China Preferential" policy developed further
during the Reagan Administration. In November 1983, the
Commerce Department amended the EAR by grouping China with
the non-Communist countries in Country Group V. The 1983
regulation, however, made a number of very significant
exceptions to the general policy of bringing export controls
for China into conformance with those for non-communist
t. 202coun r.1es.
In summery, the U.S. export controls for the PRC
evolved through three major stages. "China Differential",
equalization the "Soviet Bloc" countries, and "China
Preferential" periods. After July, 1989, however, the
200 • Meese, Id. at 35.
201 . George, Biallo, Stein, Trade with the People's Republic
of China: Current status and Future Prospects, 3 NW.J.INT'L.
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Tianmen Event, rising u.s. non-proliferation concerns and
the cold war's end, have prompted some mixed changes in the
u.s. export control policy.
B. China's Current status in u.s. Export Requlations.
As U.S. export regulation underwent major change in
late 1991 and early 1992, it also brought some changes to
the Chinese status in the regulations. For example, a
licensing guideline in 1981 initially set technical levels
acceptable for export to China at twice those approved to
the Soviet Union. In 1983, the Office of Export Administra-
tion divided the commodities for which validated license
applications are most frequently received into three lists,
the green, yellow and red lists. Items on the green list
were authorized for export to China. Validated license
applications to export items on the yellow and red lists,
which involved higher levels of technology and which were
more directly adaptable to military uses, were reviewed by
both the Office of Export Administration and the Department
of Defense under the more stringent standard of whether the
commodities might significantly contribute to the Chinese
military potential. with respect to the commodities on the
red list, license applications would be generally
denied. 203 As most of the items on the green list have
203.John F. Mckenzie, Recent Amendments to the Export
Administration Regulations implementing the United states
Policy of Liberalizing Restrictions on Trade with the People'S
Republic of China, Legal Aspects of Doing Business with China,
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been decontrolled, and also the political changes in the
former "Soviet Bloc", this division of items for export
control to China has therefor been abolished. Presently,
Chinese status has proximately enjoyed the same treatment as
those by the former "Soviet Bloc" countries. Yet there are
still some difference between China and former "Soviet Bloc"
countries in the export control regulations regarding
Country Group status and Advisory Notes.
In the past two decade, as the u.S. policy to relax the
control to China emerged, China witnessed many changes in
its status in the Country group. Before 1973, China was in
t 204 h' h . b d tthe Coun ry Group Z, w 1C 1S an em argoe coun ry
group. China remained in Country Group Y until 1979, which
is a controlled destination. In 1980, a new Country Group P
was created so that China could be distinguished from the
"Soviet Bloc" countries. Since November 23, 1983, China has
been reclassified from Country Group P to Country Group V
for export control purposes.That is where China's status is
now in the u.S. export control regulations.
Being classified in Country Group V, China enjoys more
favorable treatment. As noted above, classification of a
country in a particular Country Group determines both the
validated licensing requirements and licensing policy for
proposed exports to that country. For a number of
Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series 1985.
204 . 15 C.F.R. § 370 supplement No.1. (1972) and (1973).
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commodities on the CCL a validated license is required for
export to destinations in Country Group P, Q, S, W, and Y
and Z., but it is not required for exports to destinations
205in Country Group T and V.
with respect to the vast majority of commodities that
are subject to export controls for national security
reasons(the items identified by the last ECCN code letters
"A" and "B"in the CCL), a validated license is required for
export to any destination, except Canada. The licensing
policy in granting or denying validated license applications
for such commodities, however, varies considerably by
Country Group. For example, the application for proposed
security-controlled exports to destinations in Country Group
T and V are generally reviewed on the basis of whether there
is a significant risk that the proposed commodity will be
diverted to a country that is potentially hostile to u.s..
In contrast, the applications for the same proposed exports
of such commodities to Country Group Q.S.W and Yare
reviewed on the basis of whether the commodities may make a
significant contribution to the military potential of the
country of destination.206
205 Jhon F. Mckenzie, u.s. Export Control on High Technology
exports to the People's Republic of China: Recent Development,
Commercial Law and Practice Course Book Series Legal Aspects
of Doing Business with China 1986.
206. According to the EAR, the licensing policy for exports to
Country V generally is "one of approval of applications unless
there is a significant risk that the commodities or data will
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While the general licensing policy for China is to
consider exports under Country Group T and V policies, there
is particular concern about exports that would make a direct
and significant contribution to nuclear weapons and their
deliver systems, electronic and anti-submarine warfare,
intelligence gathering, power projection, and air
superiority. However, licenses to China may be approved even
when the end-user or end-use is military, and commodities or
data may be approved for export even though they may
contribute to Chinese military development.207
There are, nevertheless, some special requirements for
China. Exports to China of "A" items and of technical data
not covered by a general license GTDA or GTDR require review
and approval in CoCom, unless an ECCN "advisory note"
indicates the likelihood of approval or favorable
consideration, either for exports to the PRC or for all
controlled countries. Some exports to China have been
brought under more restrictive rules pursuant to a June 1991
directive from President Bush that was prompted by Chinese
transfers of missile technology. These restrictions include
exports of computers with a CTP over 41 MTOPS208 and
be used or diverted contrary to the objectives of a specificu.s. export control program." See 15 C.F.R. § 785.4(g).
207 . 15 C.F.R. § 785.4(c) (1).
208 CTP stands for Composite Theoretical Performance and
MTOPS stands for Millions of Theoretical Operations Per
Second.
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exports of technology for satellites to be launched on
Chinese rockets. The continuation of these restrictions will
depend upon Chinese cooperation with missile proliferation
control efforts. The advisory notes in CCL entitled "Note
for the People's Republic of China" indicate those exports
that are more likely to be approved and those that generally
will not require review in CoCom and may be reexported to
the PRC from CoCom countries under licenses issued in those
countries. CoCom's 1991 Core List eliminated many such China
notes, as many of the relatively less sensitive items to
which the notes applied were totally decontrolled to all
destinations.
As it is required that the items with A or B suffix are
under CoCom control, a validated license is needed to export
these commodities to controlled countries, including the
PRC, and many advisory notes are used to facilitate this
licensing procedure. There are 32 Advisory Notes in the
CCL, which cover 27 ECCNs. These notes deal with almost all
the controlled commodities, technology and software which
are either likely to be approved or need a favorable
consideration to export to the destinations in the country
group designated in each note. For example, 1C18A item has a
Advisory Note that covers certain explosives and mixtures in
reasonable quantities for civilian or industrial purposes,
indicating "likely to be approved" to export to China. A
careful reading the CCL Advisory Notes makes clear that most
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of the items that have Advisory Notes put China at the same
control level as the former "Soviet Bloc" countries except
those items in the telecommunication category where China
together with several eastern European countries receives
more favorable treatment than former Soviet union countries.
CoCom review of PRC cases is on an expedited six~week
schedule. License applications to export to the PRC
commodities with an "A" suffix on the CCL entry must be
accompanied by a PRC End-User certificate issued by the
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade. However, a
form BXA 629P consignee statement may be substituted if the
goods are covered by an advisory note for Country Groups Q,
W d Y 209, an •
C.ProsDects.
In the past several years, the world has seen more than
10% GNP growth rate in the Chinese economy, due to the free
market economic reform and an open door policy, in which the
two-way trade between China and U.S. has played a very
important role. On October 10, 1992, the U.S. reached an
agreement with China in which the Chinese government agreed
to eliminate barriers to imports from the U.S. Among other
things, China committed to eliminate a vast number of
quotas, licensing requirements, control, and other
restrictions upon imports of U.S. products. At the same
time, the Chinese government agreed to reduce tariffs and
209 . 15 C.F.R. S 775.6.
106
liberalize the Chinese foreign trade system. The elimination
of such barriers began on December 31, 1992, with final
phase-out of restrictions scheduled to occur on December 31,
1997.210 In early 1993, China ordered more than $ 1
billion of airplanes, cars, telecommunications and oil
, t f t'l' d' 'I 't 211equ1pmen, er 1 1zer an S1m1 ar 1 ems.
The cold world's demise necessitate a redefinition of
the national security of the West and the U.S .. Thus, it is
possible that the U.S. export control system could change
significantly to protect as well as foster its interests
both in business and security. As far as the trade with
China is concerned, U.S. national security interests will
most likely dwell on the non-proliferation and the human
rights concerns. However, the balance between those security
interests and U.S. business interests will possibly tip
toward the later, so long as there is no imminent danger to
the security interests.
210 • 57 F.R. 47889-03.
211 • C. Sims, China steps Up Speeding to Keep U. S• Trade
status, New York Times May 7, 1993.
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